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ABSTRACT
Reading Hume’s ‘Of the Standard of Taste’:
Taking Hume Seriously
by
KWOK Ka Wing
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This thesis presents an interpretation of David Hume’s essay ‘Of the Standard of
Taste’. The most distinguishing feature of this interpretation is the emphasis placed
on the significance of Hume’s general philosophical position in a faithful reading of
this philosophical classic. The success of this interpretation will show that Hume’s
essay should be read as an integral part of his system of philosophy.
There are three parts in this thesis. The first part is an overview of some key
aspects of Hume’s philosophy which are relevant to my interpretation. Unlike many
contemporary philosophers in the analytic tradition, Hume is a systematic thinker. A
faithful reading of his works should take his general philosophical framework
seriously. Therefore, this overview of his system serves as the general background of
the next two parts.
The second part is a discussion of Hume’s aesthetic thought. More specifically,
it provides an exposition of his view on beauty and judgements of beauty. This part
completes the stage-setting for the development of my interpretation, by helping the
reader form a more specific conceptual framework for understanding Hume’s essay.
The third part develops an interpretation of ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ according
to what has been provided in the previous two parts. It starts with an outline of the
essay, which indicates Hume’s aim in writing it. After that, a few sections are
devoted to some central elements of the essay. The last section of this part discusses
four controversies concerning Hume’s essay. These discussions establish the strength
of this interpretation, or at least, the fruitful prospect of an interpretative project that
integrates Hume’s essay into his whole system.
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Introduction
It is generally agreed that Hume’s ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ is one of the most
important works in aesthetics. A large literature on this essay emerged in the last 50
years. Quite a number of insightful observations have been made, but they seem to
have generated more disputes than agreements. Among these disputes, the one
concerning the relation between this essay and Hume’s other philosophical works
seems to be the most fundamental one, though it has seldom been explicitly
discussed. Earlier discussions tend to treat this essay as a self-standing work; but
recently, more effort has been made to draw on resources from Hume’s system. The
reason why this dispute seems to be the most fundamental one is quite
straightforward—our stance regarding it determines whether we should bring in
resources from Hume’s major works in understanding the essay.
In ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, Hume does not employ most of his characteristic
terminology. This might explain why earlier readings of it tend to avoid importing
thoughts from his other writings. Another reason might be related to the
advertisement in the first edition of his Essays, Moral and Political (1741), a later
edition of which contains ‘Of the Standard of Taste’:
The READER must not look for any Connexion among these Essays, but
must consider each of them as a Work apart. This is an Indulgence that is
given to all ESSAY-WRITERS, and is an equal EASE both to WRITER
and Reader, by freeing them from any tiresome stretch of Attention or
application. (E, p. 42)
However, this advertisement does not seem to be relevant here, as ‘Of the Standard
of Taste’ was originally published under the title Four Dissertations in 1757, 16
years later than the advertisement cited above. In one of his 1755 letters to Andrew
Millar, Hume considers this volume as ‘a fourth less than my Enquiry’ (L 1, p. 223).
The comparison made here suggests that, perhaps, Hume thinks that the pieces in this
volume are closer to his Treatise and Enquiries than to his Essays. Although ‘Of the
Standard of Taste’ was written in haste to substitute for two other essays withdrawn
from the Four Dissertations (Gracyk 2011), the fact that it was written with this aim
in mind should show that Hume probably wants it to fit with the style of that volume.
1

If this is the case, then it is not clear that the Essays’ advertisement should apply to
‘Of the Standard of Taste’, despite that fact that Hume, soon after the publication of
the Four Dissertations, decided to insert it among the Essays (L 1, p.247).
Moreover, although it is true that the writing style of ‘Of the Standard of Taste’
is closer to his Essays than his Enquiries, it does not follow that it is intended to be a
work which performs the same role as other essays. Here, Hume’s distinction of
metaphysical writing and moral writing is illuminating. While the former aims at
discovering the ‘hidden truths’ of human nature by a careful analysis of the observed
human phenomena (EHU 1.2), the latter aims at promoting virtue by bringing people
to ‘feel the difference between vice and virtue’ (EHU 1.1). Most of the essays
collected in the original volume of the Essays should be classified as moral writings
(Immerwahr 1991, p. 10-12). But this does not seem to be the case for ‘Of the
Standard of Taste’. Hume describes his intention in this essay as ‘to mingle some
light of the understanding with the feelings of sentiment’ (E-ST, p. 272). It means he
is trying to use his understanding to analyse and reveal the ‘hidden truths’ of the
observed phenomena concerning the feelings of sentiment. This is doubtlessly an aim
of a piece of metaphysical writing. If this suggestion is accepted, then we should
treat it as a part of his science of human nature, and welcome any interpretation
which duly acknowledges its theoretical background in Hume’s Treatise and
Enquiries.
Motivated by the above considerations, this thesis is an attempt to develop an
interpretation of Hume’s ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ which significantly emphasises
its connection with his general philosophical framework. The success of this
interpretation will show that Hume’s essay should be read as an integral part of his
system of philosophy.
There are three parts in this thesis. The first part is an overview of some key
aspects of Hume’s philosophy which are relevant to my interpretation. Unlike many
contemporary philosophers in the analytic tradition, Hume is a systematic thinker. A
faithful reading of his works should take his thoughts in other area of philosophy
seriously. Therefore, this overview of his system serves as the general background of
the next two parts.
The second part is a discussion of Hume’s aesthetic thought. More specifically,
it provides an exposition of his view on beauty and judgements of beauty. This part
2

completes the stage-setting for the development of my interpretation, by helping the
readers grasp a more specific conceptual framework which guides their
understanding of Hume’s essay.
The third part develops an interpretation of ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ according
to what has been provided in the previous two parts. It starts with an outline of the
essay, which indicates Hume’s aim in writing it. After that, a few chapters are
devoted to some central elements of the essay. The last chapter of this part discusses
four controversies concerning Hume’s essay. These discussions should be able to
show the strength of this interpretation; or at least, the fruitful prospect of any
interpretative project which integrates Hume’s essay into his whole system.

3

Part I
Overview of Hume’s Philosophy

4

Chapter 1
Experimental Method
Perhaps it is impossible to appreciate the value of Hume’s philosophy without
always bearing in mind his methodology. It would not be far from the truth to think
that Hume’s methodology has shaped his philosophy in every detail. The best
description of his philosophy is probably found in the subtitle of A Treatise of
Human Nature—‘Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of
Reasoning into Moral Subjects’. By ‘experimental method’, Hume has in mind
something similar to the method adopted by the founders of modern natural science,
such as Francis Bacon, Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton; but his version is
nonetheless different from theirs. Hume’s own illustration of his method can be
found in the introduction of the Treatise:
We must therefore glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious
observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common
course of the world, by men’s behaviour in company, in affairs, and in
their pleasures. Where experiments of this kind are judiciously collected
and compar’d, we may hope to establish on them a science, which will not
be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility to any other of
human comprehension. (T Intro. 10)
Hume thinks that an accurate observation of experience is essential to the
development of his moral philosophy. We should bear in mind that Hume’s aim is to
establish a science of human nature, where ‘human’ means what we would nowadays
call a ‘person’, in contrast to a ‘human being’. The same distinction might also be
put as that between a moral being and a natural being, and relatedly that between
moral science and natural science. This science of human nature includes topics
which fall under today’s branches of philosophy, such as epistemology, moral
philosophy, philosophy of mind, philosophy of art, philosophy of religion, etc.
In order to illustrate the role of accurate observations in Hume’s experimental
method, we might consider how he would discuss a belief which is observed to be
held by all people. The fact that this belief is so common suggests that our believing
5

it might somehow be a consequence of a common human nature. Therefore, a
science of human nature should try to provide an explanation of why this belief is so
common. Upon analysis, it is possible that this belief is not rationally justifiable, but
Hume would not thus stop here and ask his reader to abandon this belief; rather, he
would revise the fact to be explained as that this belief is held by all people despite
the fact that it is not rationally justifiable. He would try to trace the genesis of this
belief, and show how common human nature would cause us to believe in it. A
particular example in Hume’s works is our causal belief.
The importance of accurate observations is that the comparison of observations
is required for Hume to discover the regularities in human nature, with which he
could proceed to formulate his explanation of various phenomena. If the observations
are not accurate, he would not be able to find out the regularities which truly belong
to the human nature, and hence his explanation will then be false. An accurate
observation would involve a careful analysis of the phenomena observed, the result
of which might show that a belief is not rationally justified. Without a proper
understanding of Hume’s methodology, his readers might wrongly take this as his
conclusion, or even treat him as a sceptic who would like to reform the system of
human knowledge by throwing out all beliefs which are not justified. Such a reading
of Hume has mistaken what belongs to the starting point of the investigation as the
end. The real explanation starts rather than ends where an irrational belief has been
correctly shown to be irrational. A correct interpretation of Hume’s works must
make sure what the fact to be explained is.
Hume’s ‘experimental’ method also requires that we should stay within the
boundary of experience in the development of his science of human nature:
And tho’ we must endeavour to render all our principles as universal as
possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all
effects from the simplest and fewest causes, ’tis still certain we cannot go
beyond experience; and any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the
ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as
presumptuous and chimerical. (T Intro. 8)
Although the moral philosopher must attempt to explain the observed human
phenomena by general principles, these principles should be formed wholly on the
basis of experience. Thus, he must construct his explanation by using only resources
6

from experience. The general principles formed can be further generalised and
reduced to more general ones; but once we have arrived at the boundary set by our
experience, we should be contented with the simple and general principles
formulated. Although it would be quite natural for us to search for the ultimate
reason for such principles, ‘we can give no reason for our most general and most
refin’d principles, beside our experience of their reality’ (T Intro. 9). This restriction
applies to every part of his philosophy, including his theory of art criticism.
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Chapter 2
Perceptions of the Mind:
Impressions, Ideas, and Their Relations
The experimental method is supported by Hume’s view on the limit of experience.
He thinks that all we can experience are ‘perceptions’ of our mind, which can be
distinguished into ideas and impressions; and both could also be further
distinguished into simple and complex: ‘Simple perceptions or impressions and ideas
are such as admit of no distinction nor separation. The complex are the contrary to
these, and may be distinguished into parts’ (T 1.1.1.2). Hume observes a
correspondence between impressions and ideas. They resemble ‘in every other
particular, except their degree of force and vivacity’ (T 1.1.1.3). If an idea acquires
enough force and vivacity, it can become an impression. However, since we can have
a complex impression without the corresponding complex idea, and vice versa, this
general observation is limited in scope. Only simple impressions and simple ideas
would always have their correspondents. Together with the observation that simple
ideas are always preceded by their correspondent simple impressions, Hume
proposes the copy principle:
[A]ll our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv’d from simple
impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly
represent. (T 1.1.1.7)
Since all complex ideas can be distinguished into parts, i.e. simple ideas, and all
simple ideas are derived from simple impressions, it follows that we cannot have any
idea which is not ultimately grounded in our experience, and hence we should never
go beyond experience in our study of human nature.
It should be noted that complex ideas can be formed by simple ideas in quite
complicated ways; so there is no straightforward way for us to explicate their
underlying structure. Hume’s most famous example is our idea of cause and effect:
Our judgments concerning cause and effect are deriv’d from habit and
experience; and when we have been accustom’d to see one object united to
8

another, our imagination passes from the first to the second, by a natural
transition, which precedes reflection, and which cannot be prevented by it.
(T 1.3.13.8)
The idea of cause and effect consists in the idea of a necessary connection. Hume
realises that the latter could not be derived from any simple impression of the
objective necessary connection between external objects, as all we can perceive
through our senses and memory are the impressions of each individual objects, as
well as their contiguity in time and space, and their constant conjunction. This leaves
the idea of necessary connection unexplained. Hume ingeniously appeals to the
habitual transition from one idea to another in our imagination. Such a transition is
so irresistible that the ideas appear to be connected necessarily—our mind seems to
be determined to pass from one idea to another. Our reflective impression of the
determination of this operation in our mind supplies our idea of a necessary
connection, which in turn constitutes our idea of cause and effect. In this move we
see that Hume does not require that an idea and its corresponding impression should
be given the same name (impression of determination vs. idea of necessary
connection). Also, at least some complex idea, if unanalysed, might conceal its true
structure and constituents, and hence lead us to falsely believe in something—e.g. an
objective necessary connection between objects—the impression of which we could
never perceive.
Moreover, this example reminds us what exactly Hume is developing in his
writings. When Hume could not straightforwardly find any corresponding impression
for a problematic idea, especially when the belief in such an idea is natural and
fundamental to human beings, he does not simply reject the belief as not rationally
justified; rather, he reflects on it further, and would not give up until an impression
which causes us to have such a problematic idea is found. The impossibility of any
impression of a necessary connection between external objects might satisfy the
sceptics’ project of rejecting or withholding any idea not justified. In this case, Hume
agrees that this idea of a necessary connection between external objects is not
rationally justified. However, this sceptical conclusion could not explain why it is
natural for us to believe in such idea. For Hume’s project of developing an
experimental science of human nature, this common mistake is an interesting
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phenomenon to be explained, and hence, we might say, for Hume, the sceptics stop
where his investigation starts. As John Biro (2009) put it:
This shift of focus from a vain attempt to give a philosophical justification
of our fundamental beliefs to a scientific account of their origin in the
operations of our minds, is what Hume, with deliberate paradox, calls a
‘Sceptical Solution’ to the skeptical challenge. (p. 47)
It is important for the readers of Hume always to clearly distinguish the ‘skeptical
challenge’ from his ‘Sceptical Solution’ when such a distinction is present.
Besides simple and complex, impressions can also be distinguished along
another dimension:
As all the perceptions of the mind may be divided into impressions and
ideas, so the impressions admit of another division into original and
secondary. This division of the impressions is the same with that which I
formerly made use of when I distinguish’d them into impressions of
sensation and reflexion. Original impressions or impressions of sensation
are such as without any antecedent perception arise in the soul, from the
constitution of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the application of
objects to the external organs. Secondary, or reflective impressions are
such as proceed from some of these original ones, either immediately or by
the interposition of its idea. Of the first kind are all the impressions of the
senses, and all bodily pains and pleasures: Of the second are the passions,
and other emotions resembling them. (T 2.1.1.1)
The original impressions are caused by things external to the mind; while the
secondary impressions arise from the mind’s operations on its acquired impressions
and ideas. 1 This difference has an important epistemological implication. Since the
causes and effects of secondary impressions are both perceptions of the mind and
hence both subjectively accessible, this provides a possibility for us to understand the
nature of the human mind. As a similar access to the causes is lacking in the case of
other sciences, such as natural science, this might also explain why Hume considers
his science of human nature as the ‘only solid foundation for the other sciences’ (T
Intro. 7). A detailed examination of this difference goes beyond the scope of the

1

As suggested by Owen (2009, p. 76), the terms ‘original’ and ‘secondary’ capture more accurately
the distinctions, and hence I will only refer to the two categories by this pair of terms hereafter.
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present study, so I would like to point out only the implication it has for our way of
reading Hume. As Hume’s aim is to provide a science of human nature, which
studies the operation of the human mind, and grounds, rather than being grounded by,
other sciences, so when we are uncertain whether we have correctly identified
Hume’s target of investigation, we can check our interpretation by asking whether
the cause of the target as we interpret him is subjectively accessible or not. If it is not,
probably the interpretation is wrong.
Secondary impressions, or simply passions, can be further divided into ‘the
calm and the violent. Of the first kind is the sense of beauty and deformity in action,
composition, and external objects. Of the second are the passions of love and hatred,
grief and joy, pride and humility’ (T 2.1.1.3). This distinction, which concerns the
‘felt intensity’, should not be confused with that between strong and weak passions,
which concerns the power of influencing our ‘choices and conduct’ (Penelhum 2009,
p. 249). The difference between these two distinctions is clear in the case of a settled
principle of action which has a strong influence on our action, but does not produce
any sensible agitation (T 2.3.4.1).
Having discussed the classification of individual perceptions, we should turn to
the relations between impressions and ideas. Hume distinguishes two meanings for
the word ‘relations’:
Either for that quality, by which two ideas are connected together in the
imagination, and the one naturally introduces the other, after the manner
above-explained; or for that particular circumstance, in which, even upon
the arbitrary union of two ideas in the fancy, we may think proper to
compare them. (T 1.1.5.1)
The former is called natural relation; while the latter philosophical relation. There
are 7 kinds of philosophical relations, which fall into two classes: (a) relations of
ideas: resemblance, contrariety, degrees in any quality, and proportions in quantity
or number; and (b) matters of fact: relations of time and place, identity, and
causation. Relations of ideas are those relations ‘which depend entirely on the ideas,
which we compare together’, and matters of fact are those which ‘may be chang’d
without any change in the ideas’ (T 1.1.3.1-2). Here we can already observe that
matters of fact (as philosophical relations, but not as objective fact) can be freely
manipulated by the imagination, since the ideas related do not naturally introduce
11

each other, and the relations can be imagined to be different with the ideas held
constant.
Compared with philosophical relations, natural relations are much more central
to Hume’s philosophy. There are three natural relations: resemblance, contiguity in
time and place, and cause and effect. These relations are also the principles of
association. Notice that there is a ‘remarkable difference, that ideas are associated by
resemblance, contiguity, and causation; and impressions only by resemblance’ (T
2.1.4.3). For Hume, the existence of such associations is strongly supported by the
regularity exhibited by the otherwise chaotic operation of the human mind. The main
role played by such an association is that it facilitates the transition from one idea or
impression to another and the communication of force and vivacity between ideas or
impressions. If two ideas are associated by any of these principles, the presence of
one naturally introduces another one. Similarly for the impressions. Hume relies
heavily on the association of ideas and impressions to explain indirect passions, such
as love, hatred, pride, and humility. For example, the beauty of someone’s own body
is pleasurable, and it resembles the pleasurable feeling of pride; also, the owner of
the body and the object of pride is the same person. In virtue of this ‘double relation’
between the ideas of her own body and her pride, the presence of the former causes
the latter. The transition between ideas or impressions is natural in the sense that it is
not something we deliberately do, but just happens in our mind.
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Chapter 3
General Rules
The importance of general rules in Hume’s philosophy should be expected, given his
claim that our adherence to them ‘has such a mighty influence on the actions and
understanding, and is able to impose on the very senses’ (T 2.2.8.5). 2 The formation
of general rules is explained by custom or habit of the non-rational part of the human
mind, i.e. its natural ‘tendency to move from an idea one has to another idea linked
to the first idea by one of the principles of association’ (Biro 2009, p. 48). Taking
these two aspects together, we can say that human beings have a natural propensity
to form and follow general rules. Commentators of Hume usually focus on the
influence of the imagination on our understanding in their discussion of general rules,
but it should be noted that the passions are also subject to the same influence of
custom: ‘Custom readily carries us beyond the just bounds in our passions, as well as
in our reasonings’ (T 2.1.6.8). Anyway, for ease of illustration, I will focus on the
example of the imagination and its influence on our beliefs.
The formation and operation of general rules ‘[proceed] from those very
principles, on which all judgments concerning causes and effects depend’. Hume
continues:
Our judgments concerning cause and effect are deriv’d from habit and
experience; and when we have been accustom’d to see one object united to
another, our imagination passes from the first to the second, by a natural
transition, which precedes reflection, and which cannot be prevented by it.
Now ’tis the nature of custom not only to operate with its full force, when
objects are presented, that are exactly the same with those to which we
have been accustom’d; but also to operate in an inferior degree, when we
discover such as are similar; and tho’ the habit loses somewhat of its force

2

Whenever Hume makes a certain claim about reason or understanding, that very claim might
illuminate some aspect of his philosophy which provides that claim, as the science of human nature
consists in a study of human understanding which is made by human understanding. In particular, the
claim that our adherence to general rules has an influence on understanding implies that this
adherence also has an influence on Hume’s philosophy.
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by every difference, yet ’tis seldom entirely destroy’d, where any
considerable circumstances remain the same. (T 1.3.13.8)
Although this passage focuses on the relation of cause and effect, the other two
principles of association could also lead to general rules. Simply put, general rules
are joint products of custom and the principles of association. Their effect is the
communication of force and vivacity between impressions or ideas, and it depends
positively on the resemblance between a particular circumstance and the original
circumstances. That the operation of general rules ‘precedes reflection’ and ‘cannot
be prevented by it’ has some interesting and important consequences, and I will
come back to this topic later in this chapter.
For Hume, general rules influence both the imagination and our judgements.
Given that all general rules are effects of custom, one might think that custom should
not operate on the two faculties in contrary manner; but the fact is that the
imagination may sometimes conflict with our judgements. Hume solves this problem
by distinguishing between the first and second influence of general rules:
When an object appears, that resembles any cause in very considerable
circumstances, the imagination naturally carries us to a lively conception
of the usual effect, tho’ the object be different in the most material and
most efficacious circumstances from that cause. Here is the first influence
of general rules. But when we take a review of this act of the mind, and
compare it with the more general and authentic operations of the
understanding, we find it to be of an irregular nature, and destructive of all
the most establish’d principles of reasonings; which is the cause of our
rejecting it. This is a second influence of general rules, and implies the
condemnation of the former. Sometimes the one, sometimes the other
prevails, according to the disposition and character of the person. The
vulgar are commonly guided by the first, and wise men by the second. [… ]
The following of general rules is a very unphilosophical species of
probability; and yet ’tis only by following them that we can correct this,
and all other unphilosophical probabilities. (T 1.3.13.12)
A few points should be noted. First, the first influence of general rules is presented as
a source of error, or a source of prejudice (T 1.3.13.7). However, as both the first and
second influence of general rules share the same nature as products of custom, with
14

the only differences being in the respective objects and levels of generality, the
second influence of general rules can also be a source of error or prejudice.
Second, since the act of reflecting on the first influence of general rules is also
an act of the mind, there should also be ‘third’ or ‘fourth’ or higher influences, each
taking the one at the preceding level as its object of reflection.
Third, it seems general rules can be formed on the basis of our own direct
experiences of the objects connected, as well as indirectly on the basis of other
people’s reports of similar experience. As long as the relevant sorts of ideas arise in
our mind, no matter whether they are provided by direct experiences or indirect
reports, our imagination would be accustomed to make the transition between the
ideas as a result. Nonetheless, Hume would no doubt hold that the effect of our own
experiences is generally stronger than that of the others’ reports.
Fourth, that the second influence of general rules corrects their first influence
presupposes the uniformity of nature, including human nature. Hume is clearly aware
of this supposition: ‘all reasonings from experience are founded on the supposition,
that the course of nature will continue uniformly the same’ (A 13). Indeed, this is
also presupposed by Hume’s science of human nature, for all reasonings in this
science, so far as Hume sticks to his experimental method, are also reasonings from
experience. This supposition is not demonstrable, because its denial is conceivable,
i.e. possible, and hence its demonstration, if any, could only rely on reasoning from
experience which has already presupposed it (A 14). As the cause of this supposition
is our custom (A 15), it might also be a general rule, which is also the ultimate one,
by which all other general rules are corrected. Perhaps the indemonstrability of this
supposition of the uniformity of nature explains why Hume considers the following
of general rules as ‘a very unphilosophical species of probability’. Also, Hume’s
confession that the following of general rules is the only way we can correct all
unphilosophical probabilities involved in reasonings from experience marks him
apart from sceptics who seek an invincible foundation of our knowledge. This aspect
of Hume’s philosophy imposes a constraint on our interpretation of his writings.
When we interpret Hume’s discussion of problems which involve general rules, or
more generally, reasonings from experience, we should not expect our most accurate
interpretation to be free from attacks based on some weird but nonetheless possible,
or even actual counterexamples. That is a fundamental character of Hume’s
15

philosophy, and any interpretation which attempts to eliminate it can never be
faithful.
Lastly, in connection with the previous claim that the operation of general rules
‘precedes reflection’ and ‘cannot be prevented by it’, it should be added that both the
first and second influence of general rules do not require the rules to be explicitly
formulated. Thomas Hearn thinks that the second influence of general rules has ‘a
reflective character,’ i.e. ‘they are consciously formulated and adopted’ (1970, p.
410). I agree with the attribution of a reflective character to the second influence, but
I believe that this does not imply that the rules have to be consciously formulated,
although it is more likely to be the case if compared with the case of the first
influence. As Timothy Costelloe writes:
Hume can be seen as emphasizing the fact that all rules, whether they arise
from the imagination or the understanding, have a customary use; both
influences involve that natural transition from cause to effect, which
“precedes reflection and cannot be prevented by it.” (2007, p. 10)
The second influence of general rules is reflective because the mind applies such
rules reflectively on itself. In order for a person to be aware of the error of the first
influence of general rules, she might simply attend to a particular operation of her
mind, and in virtue of the unconscious second influence of general rules, have a
sense that there is something wrong. She definitely can check her causal reasonings
without having explicitly in mind all the eight rules proposed by Hume (T 1.2.15). It
is rather the job of philosophers, or at least those more reflective people, to formulate
and express the general rules both in their first and second influence:
Philosophy, on this view, is a particular application of the general capacity
to express formally the principles that organize common life. The
difference is that whereas ordinary reflection enables individuals to correct
errors of judgment, philosophy corrects by discovering principles,
which … explain the phenomenon in question. (Costelloe 2007, p. 12)
This concurs with Hume’s analogy between his ‘abstruse and abstract’ philosophy
and anatomy (EHU 8.8, also T 3.3.6.6). Both of them aim at providing accurate
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descriptive knowledge of the complex structure of their object of study, rather than
attempting to render their object ‘graceful or engaging’ (T 3.3.6.6). 3
In Hume’s thought the influence of general rules is significant for our sense of
beauty in virtue of sympathy, to which we now turn.

3

Hume contrasts the anatomist with the painter in this analogy. A painter, he suggests, ‘give[s] his
figure … graceful and engaging attitude or expression’ (T 3.3.6.6). Analogous to a painter is what
Hume calls a ‘moralist’. A moralist promotes virtuous characters by describing their beauty, so that
people would be attracted and emulate them.
Hume stresses the advantage a metaphysician could bring to a moralist, since unless the moralist
has drawn an accurate line between vice and virtue, she might turn out mistakenly to promote
characters which are in fact vicious. Therefore, a moralist should have an accurate understanding of
human nature, so that she would not confound the limit between vice and virtue.
A parallel line of thought underlies Hume’s ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, in which he tries to
accurately uncover the true nature of art criticism. If he succeeds, critics should be benefited by this
essay, as it can allow them to guide people in feeling the beauty of what is truly beautiful.
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Chapter 4
Sympathy
In Hume’s philosophy, ‘sympathy’ does not refer to a particular sentiment; rather, it
refers to a mechanism which enables us to feel the same passion we observe or
imagine the others feel. It explains how we can, from an idea of the other’s feeling,
come to have the same feeling. The process can be explained in four steps. 4 First, I
form an idea of the other’s feeling. In some cases, I directly observe another person’s
expression of the passion she feels, and form an idea of it. This is possible because of
the resemblance between every human being. The repeated experiences of my own
passions and my own corresponding expressions establish certain general
connections between passion and expression. My mind naturally moves from the
idea of other person’s expression, which is similar to mine, to an idea of the
corresponding passion.
However, it is not necessary that an actual expression should be observed for us
to form an idea of other people’s feelings—such an idea could also be acquired by
imagining the situation of other people. In my mind there are many general rules
formed on the basis of my experiences of various situations and the various
sentiments they produce. When I imagine the situation of some other people, there is
an idea of their situation in my mind, and the relevant general rule—which is also in
my mind—causes my imagination to move from this idea to an idea of the sentiment
which has been observed to be generally produced by that kind of situation. Thus, we
can acquire an idea of what sentiment would be produced on those people. Perhaps
Hume’s real thought is that, when the person affected by the character or object in
question is present, our impression of her expression, if it agrees with the expression
which would be caused by the sentiment we anticipate her to have, is just a source of
extra force and vivacity to be added to our idea of that anticipated sentiment.
This suggestion seems to be supported by Hume’s illustration of the contrary
effect of sympathy and comparison on our sentiment (T 3.3.2.5). In his example,

4

The four-step distinction made here is an amended version of the one presented in Brown (2008, p.
233).
18

which is adopted from Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura 2.1-4, we can form an idea of
‘the miserable condition of those who are at sea in a storm’ merely by thinking of
such a situation. As he goes on, he tries to show what would follow if our idea of the
pain of those in danger becomes stronger and more sensible. He first brings in the
presence of an actual ship at a distance from the shore on which we imagine
ourselves standing, and observe that the idea of pain becomes livelier. Then, he
further asks us to imagine the ship to be nearer to us, to the extent that we can clearly
see how those people on the ship suffer from their miserable fate, in which case the
painful idea has acquired a force so great that the effect of sympathy overturns that
of comparison. The role of the direct perception of the painful expressions in this
example is obviously to add force and vivacity to the idea of pain already formed
from the beginning.
It might be objected that the application of my own general rules to other people
is illegitimate, as people differ in all sorts of ways. They have a different personality;
they receive a different education; they grow up in a different culture, etc. To extend
my own general rules to other people is acceptable only when the person in question
is similar to me enough. In response, we should notice that the application of the
general rule to the case of other people is not something I do deliberately. As
mentioned in the previous chapter, the application of general rules ‘precedes
reflection’ and ‘cannot be prevented by it’. Whenever a relevant idea arises in my
mind, the imagination is immediately prompted to move to another idea which is
connected to the first idea by a general rule in my mind. Of course I can reflect on
the details of the particular situation, and stand back from believing that the second
idea should really follow. However, this is the second influence of a general rule, the
operation of which presupposes that the second idea has already been produced in
my mind. As the present concern is how such an idea of the others’ sentiment can be
formed in my mind, rather than whether the formation of this idea is rationally
justified, this worry is irrelevant.
On the other hand, perhaps the problem is that the particularities of the situation
and the people in question do not display sufficient similarity with my experienced
situation and me. Therefore, the perception or imagination of such would not trigger
the operation of the general rules in my mind, and hence I could not form any idea of
the sentiment of those people. Actually, this problem cannot show that in principle
19

we cannot have the idea of the sentiments of those people. The general rule involved
in the formation of an idea of other people’s sentiments can be quite general. In order
for it to be effective, I would need to understand the situation in some general way.
The particularity of a situation might upon proper understanding be reduced to a
specific combination of certain general features. With a clear and distinct conception
of the situation, such general features can be perceived, and their corresponding ideas
would then set the imagination in motion, and thus provide me an idea of a sentiment
in accord with a certain general rule. The initial troublesome particularities are thus
shown to be just a signal of my obscure conception of the situation, a weakness of
mine which can certainly be cured if due effort is made.
The second step of sympathy is that the three principles of association,
especially that of resemblance, apply to the idea of myself and my idea of any other
human being. There are certain general similarities within the whole species, and
also some more specific similarities between particular persons. Living in the same
age or country, friendship, kinship, etc. also contribute to the association. Notice that
the strength of such relations varies for different persons.
Third, Hume maintains that:
’Tis evident, that the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always
intimately present with us, and that our consciousness gives us so lively a
conception of our own person, that ’tis not possible to imagine, that any
thing can in this particular go beyond it. (T 2.1.11.4)
Fourth, in virtue of the principles of association, the force and vivacity of the
idea of myself is communicated to my idea of the person with whom I am
sympathising, and in turn to my idea of her passion. Since the only difference
between an impression and an idea of the same content is their degree of force and
vivacity, insofar as my idea of the person’s passion has become forceful or vivacious
enough, it becomes that very passion. A clarification is needed here. That the passion
thus acquired corresponds to an idea of her passion but not of my passion might lead
some readers to raise an objection: all passions I feel are my passions, so how could I
feel another’s passion? Note that the idea of ‘her passion’ is actually a complex one,
which could be distinguished into simple parts, one of which is a simple idea of the
passion. This simple idea is shared by the complex idea of my passion and the
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complex impression of the other’s passion. What is essential for sympathy is that that
simple idea of passion can become a passion.
The importance of sympathy to Hume’s moral philosophy is obvious in his
Treatise. Simply put, sympathy allows us to adopt the required general viewpoint,
instead of our own interested viewpoint, to judge a person’s character morally.
It has been observ’d, in treating of the passions, that pride and humility,
love and hatred, are excited by any advantages or disadvantages of the
mind, body, or fortune; and that these advantages or disadvantages have
that effect, by producing a separate impression of pain or pleasure. The
pain or pleasure, which arises from the general survey or view of any
action or quality of the mind, constitutes its vice or virtue, and gives rise to
our approbation or blame, which is nothing but a fainter and more
imperceptible love or hatred. (T 3.3.5.1)
The moral species of love and hatred differ from the personal ones in the
adopted viewpoint. The object of moral judgements is a person’s character, i.e. her
behavioural tendency in certain circumstances. The realisation of a tendency depends
on the presence of certain circumstances, and hence the attribution of a tendency to a
person does not require this tendency to have an actual opportunity of realisation.
Furthermore, even if it is realised, it might not have any effect on me, or even if I am
one of those being affected, the effect might vary for different people. So in order to
evaluate a person’s character, I need to correct my personal sentiment by adopting a
general viewpoint:
’Tis only when a character is consider’d in general, without reference to
our particular interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as
denominates it morally good or evil. (T 3.1.2.4)
In the case of moral judgement, to adopt a general viewpoint is to sympathise
with those people affected by this character if the requisite circumstances obtain, and
to share the passion they would have. This correction is actually an instance of the
second influence of general rules, which is a constraint based on our reflection on the
operation of our affection.
One problem concerns us at this point. Different people inevitably stand in
different relations with those people in the required circumstance. As a result, the
natural relations connecting a person’s ideas of those affected by the character to a
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person’s idea of herself vary in strength for different individuals. As these principles
of association determine the force and vivacity of the passion acquired through
sympathy, different people will have passions of different degrees of force and
vivacity, and it seems to follow that the general viewpoint does not guarantee that
different people will form the same moral judgement, or at least, not the same degree
of praise or blame. This problem can be solved by pointing out that the second
influence of general rules is not merely a requirement to correct our sentiment, but
also to correct our language:
In general, all sentiments of blame or praise are variable, according to our
situation of nearness or remoteness, with regard to the person blam’d or
prais’d, and according to the present disposition of our mind. But these
variations we regard not in our general decisions, but still apply the terms
expressive of our liking or dislike, in the same manner, as if we remain’d
in one point of view. Experience soon teaches us this method of correcting
our sentiments, or at least, of correcting our language, where the
sentiments are more stubborn and inalterable. (T 3.3.1.16)
Hume’s presentation suggests that the correction of sentiment and that of language
are two different outcomes of the same requirement. This makes the requirement
quite loose, as one can fulfil it even if her pronounced judgement, which reflects the
general viewpoint, does not have a corresponding general sentiment as its ground. I
suspect it would have been better to have separated them into two requirements.
Anyway, for my purpose in this study, it is sufficient to have shown that the adoption
of the general viewpoint does not guarantee or require an agreement in the force and
vivacity of the sentiment actually felt. Merely using language which reflects this
general viewpoint is already acceptable.
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Chapter 5
Reason and the Passion
Hume distinguishes between two principal parts of human nature, ‘which are
requisite in all its actions, the affections and understanding; ’tis certain, that the blind
motions of the former, without the direction of the latter, incapacitate men for society’
(T 3.2.2.14). This broad distinction is operative throughout the whole system of
Hume’s philosophy; however, this distinction was never drawn by him precisely
enough. ‘Passions’ and ‘sentiments’ should belong to the class of ‘affections’, and
‘reason’ should belong to ‘understanding’; but Hume does not spell out the
connection between these terms. For the present purpose, I will just bypass this
complication.
In the passage quoted above, Hume refers to the ‘blind motion’ of the affections.
So what does Hume mean by this figurative description? Hume is pointing to the
involuntary nature of the operation of the affections. They are produced in the mind
according to some original principles of human nature. Given a certain stimulus, a
certain affection follows as a reaction. No conscious and voluntary act of the mind
could alter such regularities, ‘’tis certain we can naturally no more change our own
sentiments, than the motions of the heavens’ (T 3.2.5.3). In other words, our passions
and sentiments are immediately produced by certain external or internal stimuli.
Moreover, ‘[a] passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of
existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any
other existence or modification’ (T 2.1.2.4). Also, motives like desire and aversion
are passions.
As for reason, Hume writes:
Reason is the discovery of truth or falshood. Truth or falshood consists in
an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real
existence and matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this
agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can
never be an object of our reason. (T 3.1.1.9)
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Simply put, reason concerns the truth or falsity of philosophical relations. Recall that
philosophical relations are arbitrary unions of ideas (T 1.1.5.1, also see Chapter 2),
there is no natural transition from one idea to another. Reason only compares the
ideas given to it, and does not produce new ideas (T 1.3.14.5). Also, reason ‘can
never be a motive to any action of the will’, neither can it ‘oppose[s] passion in the
direction of the will’ (T 2.3.3.1).
Such characterisations of passions and reason might lead Hume’s readers to
criticise him as being a subjectivist regarding morality, and as he is well known for
grounding morality on sentiment:
All morality depends upon our sentiments; and when any action, or quality
of the mind, pleases us after a certain manner, we say it is virtuous; and
when the neglect, or non-performance of it, displeases us after a like
manner, we say that we lie under an obligation to perform it. (T 3.2.5.4)
The non-representative character of sentiments implies that there is no truth or falsity
in matters of sentiments:
Now ’tis evident our passions, volitions, and actions, are not susceptible of
any such agreement or disagreement; being original facts and realities,
compleat in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions,
volitions, and actions. ’Tis impossible, therefore, they can be pronounc’d
either true or false, and be either contrary or conformable to reason. (T
3.1.1.9)
So for any persons having different moral sentiments concerning the same object,
one might think that they are equally right, as there is simply no standard besides the
sentiments, and reason has no role to play in morality.
However, this relativist view is not Hume’s position. Although reason cannot
alter the original principles of human nature, it can still guide our moral sentiments
by discovering the true relations of ideas and matters of fact, and thus eliminate those
‘unreasonable’ moral sentiments which are caused by the false relations of ideas and
matters of fact:
’[T]is only in two senses, that any affection can be call’d unreasonable.
First, When a passion, such as hope or fear, grief or joy, despair or security,
is founded on the supposition of the existence of objects, which really do
not exist. Secondly, When in exerting any passion in action, we choose
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means insufficient for the design’d end, and deceive ourselves in our
judgment of causes and effects. Where a passion is neither founded on
false suppositions, nor chooses means insufficient for the end, the
understanding can neither justify nor condemn it. (T 2.3.3.16)
In short, Hume’s view that human nature is immutable implies that in matters of
sentiments, the same input should always produce the same output. Therefore, in
order to change the output, the input must be changed. Hume famously claims that:
Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never
pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them. (T 2.3.3.4)
Reason serves the passions by discovering the truth, and obeys them because of its
inert nature.
A related distinction between matters of fact and matters of sentiment could be
illuminated by a brief discussion on the ‘is-ought’ distinction. An is-statement is a
descriptive statement which tells us the relations of ideas or the matters of fact; an
ought-statement bears a normative force which motivates or forbids us to do certain
action. Based on his distinction between reason and sentiments, Hume claims that no
ought-statement could be deduced only from is-statements.
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always
remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of
reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations
concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that
instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with
no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This
change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as
this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ’tis
necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time
that a reason shou’d be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable,
how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely
different from it. (T 3.1.1.27)
This distinction might at first sight seem to be quite clear, but further reflection
might show that it is indeed not so easy to determine the status of a statement
containing the word ‘ought’ or its cognates. As Hume thinks that an obligation is just
an action the neglect or non-performance of which displeases us after a certain
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manner, it seems an ought-statement can be converted into an is-statement about our
sentiment. Therefore, one might object that we can reason from at least some
is-statements to ought-statements. In reply, we can point out that a statement
containing an ‘ought’ or some other evaluative term is not necessarily an
ought-statement. Hume’s distinction between these two kinds of statements does not
concern the term used, but concerns the way a statement is made (or what speech-act
theorists call its ‘force’). 5 An is-statement is made by reason alone; while an
ought-statement is made on the basis of a certain sentiment felt by the person who
makes it. Therefore, when I say ‘everyone ought not to lie’, this might be an
is-statement if it is just a factual report to the effect that lying displeases people,
regardless of my own sentiment towards it; or it might be an ought-statement, if I
make it on the basis of my felt displeasure caused by the presence of lying. Only in
the latter case would I be truly under an obligation and be expressing the expectation
that this is the same for the other people. The fact that most people share a certain
sentiment towards lying can just be neutral for me if I am not displeased by it.

5

Or, as Dabney Townsend puts it, this distinction is made between ‘ways of thinking, understood as
operations of the mind, not between two classes of propositions’ (Townsend 2001, p. 4).
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Part II
Hume’s Aesthetics
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Chapter 6
Beauty
Compared with his deep and scrupulous treatment of knowledge and morality,
Hume’s discussion of beauty is brief and fragmentary. In the Treatise and the two
Enquiries, beauty is merely discussed in order to illuminate his views on morality. In
Hume’s Essays, although we can find some pieces focusing on art and criticism, no
systematic presentation of his view of beauty is available. Worse still, in Hume’s
scattered notes on beauty, he mentions without clear definitions several kinds of
beauty, such as natural beauty, moral beauty, beauty of form, beauty of interest, etc.
This causes difficulties for any attempt to clarify and articulate his views, especially
for those commentators focusing on his aesthetics. This chapter will try to sort out
some central aspects of Hume’s idea of beauty. Given the difficulties just mentioned,
this attempt will inevitably be brief and somewhat inconclusive; but it should
nonetheless be able to help us understand his ‘Of the Standard of Taste’.
The sense of beauty and deformity, according to Hume, is a calm passion (T
2.1.1.3). By itself this claim leaves undecided the nature of beauty: it can be some
quality in the object, in which case the sense of it is similar to the perception of
geometrical properties; or it can be purely a subjective feeling. Let’s call the first
case the quality-view, and the second case the sentiment-view. In the Treatise we can
find a passage which strongly suggests the quality-view:
[B]eauty is such an order and construction of parts, as either by the
primary constitution of our nature, by custom, or by caprice, is fitted to
give a pleasure and satisfaction to the soul. (T 2.1.8.2)
Also, in the second Enquiry, we find:
Some species of beauty, especially the natural kinds, on their first
appearance, command our affection and approbation; and where they fail
of this effect, it is impossible for any reasoning to redress their influence,
or adapt them better to our taste and sentiment. (EPM 1.9)
That some species of beauty might fail to ‘command our affection and approbation’
suggests that beauty is not equal to the sentiment it arouses.
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However, in both Enquiries and his essays, we can find passages which both
affirm the sentiment-view and deny the quality-view:
Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more properly than perceived.
(EHU 12.33)
EUCLID has fully explained all the qualities of the circle; but has not, in
any proposition, said a word of its beauty. The reason is evident. The
beauty is not a quality of the circle. It lies not in any part of the line, whose
parts are equally distant from a common centre. It is only the effect, which
that figure produces upon the mind, whose peculiar fabric or structure
renders it susceptible of such sentiments. (EPM APP 1.14; an almost
identical passage can be found in E-Sc, p. 219)
The mathematician, who took no other pleasure in reading VIRGIL, but
that of examining ENEAS’s voyage by the map, might perfectly
understand the meaning of every Latin word, employed by that divine
author; and consequently, might have a distinct idea of the whole narration.
He would even have a more distinct idea of it, than they could attain who
had not studied so exactly the geography of the poem. He knew, therefore,
every thing in the poem: But he was ignorant of its beauty; because the
beauty, properly speaking, lies not in the poem, but in the sentiment or
taste of the reader. And where a man has no such delicacy of temper, as to
make him feel this sentiment, he must be ignorant of the beauty, though
possessed of the science and understanding of an angel. (E-Sc, p. 219)
Beauty is no quality in things themselves: It exists merely in the mind
which contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty.
(E-ST, p. 268)
No clear statement of the same position can be found in the Treatise, hence Hume
might have changed his mind after the publication of it; or at least, as the second
Enquiry includes apparently contrary passages, the word ‘beauty’ might have
different meanings for Hume. As suggested by Peter Jones (1976, p. 49), perhaps the
quality which causes the sentiment of beauty is ‘by courtesy’ called ‘beauty’, and
hence the sentiment-view is the more fundamental one. In any case, as no passage
which affirms the quality-view but denies the sentiment-view can be found, while the
opposite view is presented in the passages quoted above, the sentiment-view should
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more likely be the central view of Hume. The next task is to determine more
precisely the details of this position.
In the Treatise, Hume thinks that ‘the power of producing pain and pleasure
makes in this manner the essence of beauty and deformity’ (T 2.1.8.2). Although he
does not connect pleasure and pain to beauty and deformity explicitly in his later
works, the same, or at least similar, connection is implicit there. However, as Hume
appears to have switched from the quality-view to the sentiment-view, a different
formulation should be provided. For if natural beauty is held to be a sentiment
produced by a figure upon the mind (EPM APP 1.14), it seems we can at least assert
for the moment that beauty is a sentiment accompanied by a certain pleasure, or itself
a pleasure of a certain kind; while deformity is a sentiment accompanied by a certain
pain, or itself a pain of a certain kind. Unfortunately, Hume’s texts do not provide
any decisive evidence for us to choose between these two different formulations; but
if we bear in mind his experimental method, perhaps Hume is deliberately vague
here, because no matter which formulation is the correct one, all we have in our
experience is a sensation of pleasure or pain. This is obviously the case if beauty is
itself a pleasure, and deformity a pain. If, on the other hand, beauty and deformity
are some sentiments other than the accompanying pleasure and pain, then they do not
provide separable sensations. As a result, the two formulations are effectively the
same. Perhaps it is sufficient and more faithful to Hume to say merely that by
pleasure we feel beauty, and by pain we feel deformity.
Although the sentiment-view of beauty should be more fundamental than the
quality-view, it does not mean that Hume does not use the word ‘beauty’ to refer to a
certain quality. The courtesy-use of the word ‘beauty’ is applied to qualities ‘which
are naturally fitted to excite agreeable sentiments’ (E-ST, p. 271). In this sense,
beauty is a quality’s tendency to produce the sentiment of beauty, and in the absence
of any counteracting qualities, an object possessing such a quality is beautiful. This
quality is not always realised, as there are other factors relevant to its realisation.
These factors include subjective conditions, such as ‘[a] perfect serenity of mind, a
recollection of thought, a due attention to the object’ (ibid.). More on these factors
will be said in our next chapter on the judgement of beauty.
Hume distinguishes beauty into natural beauty and moral beauty, but he does
not clearly spell out this distinction. We know that ‘[i]t is on the proportion, relation,
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and position of parts, that all natural beauty depends’ (EPM APP 1.13), but we
cannot find any similar claim concerning moral beauty. Probably moral beauty
depends on a person’s moral character, but then another question arises: what is the
difference, if any, between moral beauty and virtue? I shall leave this question
unanswered, as I could see no hint of any clear answer in Hume.
There is another question concerning the distinction between natural beauty and
moral beauty which is more interesting. Does this distinction have anything to do
with art criticism? In ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, Hume asserts without detailed
argument that differences in moral principles make us unable to relish a work which
does not properly blame a vicious manner, and hence this must be allowed to be a
blemish of that work (E-ST, p. 282-283). 6 No similar remark for natural beauty is
available. Apart from this obscure consideration, the distinction between natural
beauty and moral beauty seems to be irrelevant to art criticism.
Beauty can also be distinguished into beauty of form and beauty of interest.
Hume mentions these two kinds of beauty only in one place:
The observation of convenience gives pleasure, since convenience is a
beauty. But after what manner does it give pleasure? ’Tis certain our own
interest is not in the least concern’d; and as this is a beauty of interest, not
of form, so to speak, it must delight us merely by communication, and by
our sympathizing with the proprietor of the lodging. (T 2.2.5.16, my
italics)
Similarly, Hume does not clearly tell us the difference between these two kinds of
beauty. However, as the context of this quote is a discussion on how and why we see
the utility of something as beauty, we can anticipate that beauty of interest is a
beauty which depends on something’s utility, while beauty of form has no such
dependence. Given the contention that natural beauty depends on ‘the proportion,
relation, and position of parts’, one might be tempted to think that natural beauty and
beauty of form are equal; but this appears not to be the case, for Hume holds that
there are some morally beautiful mental qualities, such as cheerfulness, which are
immediately agreeable ‘without any utility or any tendency to farther good’ (EPM
7.2). Thus, the beauty of such qualities is not the beauty of interest, though it sounds
odd to call it a beauty of form; and it should be classified as moral beauty, rather than
6

This claim is discussed in depth in Chapter 13.
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natural beauty. Conversely, there are some qualities, such as physical strength, or the
agility of animals, which are a beauty of interest, but should be classified as natural
beauty, rather than moral beauty.
Sympathy plays an important role in our perception of beauty, especially the
beauty of interest. Without sympathy, only those characters or qualities which
actually benefit me would have a beauty of interest for me. However, as a matter of
fact, we can see the beauty of another person’s house, as well as that of an
imprisoned athlete. Sometimes we might even see the beauty of some characters or
qualities which are contrary to our own interest, such as the courage of our enemy.
We can feel the beauty of such characters or qualities by sympathising with other
people, real or imaginary, and thus our idea of such beauty is enlivened and becomes
an impression. 7
Sympathy is also involved in our perception of the beauty of form. Since our
perception of beauty does not merely consist in the perception of a figure, but also
involves the mind’s reaction to an impression of it, the subjective conditions also
partly determine the beauty perceived. Different people might perceive different
beauties, because of their different sensibility, different cultural background,
different personal experience, etc. For example, ‘in countries, where men’s bodies
are apt to exceed in corpulency, personal beauty is placed in a much greater degree
of slenderness, than in countries, where that is the most usual defect’ (EPM 8.9).
Such subjective factors constitute a person’s unique ‘viewpoint’. If a person
sympathises with another person and thus enters into her viewpoint, an object might
change from being beautiful to being deformed, or from being deformed to being
beautiful. In the case of beauty of interest, we choose the viewpoint of those who are
directly affected by the utility of the character or quality. However, for beauty of
form, it is not clear whether any particular viewpoint should be privileged, and if so,
which viewpoint that is. This problem brings us to the issue of the judgement of
beauty, to which we now turn.

7

Note that nothing said here concerns the normative question of which viewpoint should be adopted,
but just shows that we have an ability to go beyond our personal viewpoint. This normative question
is addressed in Chapter 7 and 12.
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Chapter 7
Judgements of Beauty
Hume’s view that beauty is a sentiment makes it perplexing why judgements of
beauty are needed. As he puts in ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, ‘a thousand different
sentiments, excited by the same object, are all right: Because no sentiment represents
what is really in the object’ (E-ST, p. 268). If there is no right or wrong in matters of
beauty, why should there be any judgement of beauty? As a matter of fact, neither
the maxim de gustibus non disputandum est, nor the common agreement on the
comparative judgement of the merit of Milton and Ogilby appears to be
representative of what ordinarily happens. On the one hand, even in ages like the
contemporary world, where people are more tolerant of different factual and
evaluative opinions, people both make judgements of beauty, and dispute very often
on matters of beauty. On the other hand, only a small proportion of comparative
judgements are made concerning objects so disproportioned as in the case of Milton
and Ogilby. Although Hume does not explicitly say so, this is probably also the
situation he observes. As an adherent of the experimental method, and an anatomist
of human nature, Hume’s task is to anatomise this phenomenon, and tell us what
exactly is done by a judgement of beauty.
We should start with the reason why people make judgements of beauty, rather
than rest contented with remarks limited to their own subjective sentiments. Two
possible reasons can be gathered from Hume’s works, and both of them rely on his
supposition of a common human nature. Firstly, as stressed by Peter Jones, Hume’s
view on beauty is embedded in ‘contexts where man is considered as a social being’
(1976, p. 324). One of the most important aspects of this nature as a social being is
that people want to agree with others, especially their close acquaintances (ibid., p.
338). The variety of taste could not satisfy this desire, while at the same time, a
certain degree of regularity is observable. The beauty of an object would not be
different for a person every time she looks at it. People of similar taste are seldom
totally absent in a person’s circle of acquaintances. It appears that agreement is still
possible. Therefore, different sentiments of beauty aroused by the same object in
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different people are compared in a certain way. Judgements of beauty are made, and
some of the sentiments are confirmed, while others condemned.
The second possible reason is related to Hume’s view of language in general.
He writes:
The more we converse with mankind, and the greater social intercourse we
maintain, the more shall we be familiarized to these general preferences
and distinctions, without which our conversation and discourse could
scarcely be rendered intelligible to each other. Every man’s interest is
peculiar to himself, and the aversions and desires, which result from it,
cannot be supposed to affect others in a like degree. General language,
therefore, being formed for general use, must be moulded on some more
general views, and must affix the epithets of praise or blame, in conformity
to sentiments, which arise from the general interests of the community.
(EPM 5.42)
General language is used for the communication of something accessible to the
general public. A person, in using general language, is required to adopt a general
and stable viewpoint which could be shared by other people. It seems that the word
‘beauty’ in its ‘courtesy use’ should be an instance of general language. ‘Beauty’ in
this sense refers to a certain quality in objects. As the only sensible effect such a
quality produces is a sentiment, every discourse concerning such a quality is an
‘intercourse of sentiments ... in society and conversation,’ which ‘makes us form
some general unalterable standard, by which we may approve or disapprove of’ the
quality in question (ibid.). If we do not adopt a stable viewpoint, then our
‘fluctuating situations produce a continual variation on objects, and throw them into
such different and contrary lights and positions’ (EPM 5.41). Also, if we do not
adopt the same general viewpoint, our different situations cause us to have different
sentiments, and thus we lack a common ground for communication ‘without which
our conversation and discourse could scarcely be rendered intelligible to each other’.
Understood in this way, the word ‘beauty’ in its ‘courtesy use’ requires us to
adopt the same general and stable viewpoint, and the quality of beauty in this sense
should be one which gives us a sentiment of beauty under certain circumstances,
including the adoption of the same general and stable viewpoint. As we are distanced
from our own personal viewpoint in perceiving such a quality of beauty, the
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sentiment of beauty is inevitably weaker in its intensity, and hence, for Hume, the
sense of beauty is a calm passion (T 2.1.1.3). Also, recall that Hume claims in the
Treatise that ‘beauty’ refers to the ‘order and construction of parts’ which pleases
‘either by the primary constitution of our nature, by custom, or by caprice’ (T
2.1.8.2). Now we can see that we have arrived at a narrower sense of ‘beauty’, as the
generality and stability required by the nature of general language precludes those
which please merely by caprice. Thus, it is still correct to say that all sentiments of
beauty are equally right, in the sense that such sentiments do not represent anything
and thus there is no question of truth and falsity for them. However, on the other
hand, we can also say that not all sentiments of beauty are equally right, as the
viewpoints from which the view of an object could produce these sentiments are not
all qualified as general viewpoints; and even among different possible general
viewpoints, we might still make some further discrimination, so that one and only
one of them is admitted as the correct general viewpoint, and its corresponding
sentiment of beauty as the right sentiment. The purely subjectivist view is thus
unable to answer the internal requirement of the word ‘beauty’. People make
judgements of beauty at least because they may fail to adopt the correct viewpoint,
and, as a result, make a mistake concerning whether an object really possesses a
quality of beauty.
In both reasons above, we can see that the aim of judging beauty is to reduce
variety, and to achieve stability and regularity in matters of beauty. However, it is
not obvious how such stability and regularity are achievable. As Hume clearly writes,
‘Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more properly than perceived’ (EHU
12.33). A comparison between the judgement of beauty and the judgement of
geometrical qualities can help us to see the problem.
In the case of a geometrical quality such as triangularity, when we have a
veridical perception of it, this quality causes an impression in our mind, and this
impression refers to it. 8 Depending on the agreement or disagreement between our
impression and the objective quality, our impression of such quality is either true or
8

It is in fact difficult to capture Hume’s thought on such objective judgements accurately, as to speak
of an objective quality in Hume’s philosophy is quite tricky. Strictly speaking, Hume cannot say
anything about quality as a mind-independent feature of the external world, as all we can experience
are just perceptions in mind. This makes terms like ‘real matters of fact’ perplexing. As this problem
cannot be addressed within the scope of our discussion, we can only bypass it, and understand the
referential relation pointed to here as something similar to what we normally call representation.
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false, as ‘they have a reference to something beyond themselves, to wit, real matter
of fact; and are not always conformable to that standard’ (E-ST, p. 268). The
objective quality serves as a standard of judgement. A judgement of such an
objective quality specifies the quality we should look for in order to verify it. If the
quality specified can be found in the object, the judgement is true, while contrary
opinions are falsified. As a result, different opinions of such objective qualities are
regulated and stabilised.
In contrast, our sentiment of beauty is just a pleasurable feeling caused by a
certain quality in an object, and this pleasure does not represent its cause. Therefore,
we might not be able to identify the true cause of our sentiment of beauty. It is
possible that a person, having correctly adopted a general viewpoint in surveying an
object, and in the absence of other possible errors, feels the sentiment of beauty that
object naturally produces in virtue of one of its qualities, but nonetheless has no idea
of what the true cause of her sentiment is. She could only say that the object is
beautiful, or, at most, that there is a certain je ne sais quoi which makes it beautiful.
In such a case, even when that person in some sense correctly judges an object
beautiful, her judgement does not tell us how to verify it, and thus when there are
conflicting but equally confused judgements made by different people, we are unable
to decide whose judgement is correct, and different sentiments are not regulated and
stabilised.
Therefore, in order to achieve the stability and regularity that people tend to
seek in matters of beauty, we need more than the ability to enjoy the right sentiment
of beauty. With the assumption of a common human nature that includes certain
original principles of sentiments, the same quality arouses the same sentiment of
beauty in the beholders who share the same internal state under the same external
situation. The internal state includes the delicacy of mental taste, the (metaphorical)
viewpoint adopted, the level of intelligence, etc. The relevant aspects of the external
situation include those—depending on the categories of the artworks, among which
Hume’s main concern is literature—which would affect our apprehension of
artworks. 9 A book full of typographical errors is bad in the case of literature,
9

James Grant (2013) points out that, with reference to Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary, a critic is just ‘a
judge only of literature’ in Hume’s days (p. 50, n. 25). Despite this linguistic fact, we will follow the
common practice in the literature on ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ to use a broader sense of the word
‘critic’ in referring to art critics in general.
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similarly for poor lighting in the case of painting, and a noisy concert hall in the case
of music. Therefore, in order to achieve agreement on matters of beauty, we have to
settle the disputes concerning all these factors. If a person has the ability to specify
the conditions under which her judgement of beauty is made, as well as the quality
which causes her sentiment of beauty, her judgement might then be able to be
verified by other people. Criticism is precisely that kind of activity which involves
this additional ability.
Notice here that the account given just now only describes what is needed for
the same sentiment to be shared. That a judgement of beauty is generally shared by
different people shows only that it is a candidate for the true judgement. So there is a
question concerning what makes a judgement of beauty true, but not merely
generally shared. How could we move a step further? Consider the analogy between
beauty and vision given by Hume:
If, in the sound state of the organ, there be an entire or a considerable
uniformity of sentiment among men, we may thence derive an idea of the
perfect beauty; in like manner as the appearance of objects in day-light, to
the eye of a man in health, is denominated their true and real colour, even
while colour is allowed to be merely a phantasm of the senses. (E-ST, p.
272)
Although Hume uses the term ‘perfect beauty’ here, the term ‘true and real colour’
suggests that ‘true and real beauty’ might be acceptable for him. If colour can be true
and real in the sense provided in this passage, then why not allow the same for
beauty? Therefore, we will not avoid using the term ‘true beauty’ in the following,
provided that it is understood in the sense suggested in this quote: true beauty is the
quality which produces a uniformity of sentiment of beauty among men with sound
state of the organ. Accordingly, then, an object is truly beautiful when it possesses
true beauty. Hume’s exclusion of the external situation here is objectionable, but for
our interpretative purpose, we might just follow him in focusing on the internal state.
What exactly the sound internal state is will be a topic in our discussion on ‘Of
the Standard of Taste’ in Part III. For the moment, it suffices to say that a judgement
of beauty is true when the object judged to be beautiful is truly beautiful in the sense
just given. This implies that our ability to determine the truth of a judgement of
beauty depends on our ability to determine the soundness of the internal state. In
37

order to evaluate a judgement of beauty, we have to make other judgements
concerning the soundness of the internal state. As taste is a part of this internal state,
we might want to distinguish two senses of ‘judgements of taste’. In one sense, it
means judgements made by taste. For Hume, such judgements include moral
judgements and judgements of beauty. In another sense, ‘judgements of taste’ are
those which judge the soundness of taste. For clarity’s sake, hereafter, ‘judgements
of taste’ will only be used to refer to those judgements concerning the soundness of
taste, in order to sharply distinguish them from judgements of beauty, which concern
the quality of beauty.
The difficulty of achieving stability and regularity in matters of beauty should
not be underestimated. Nothing said above has indicated how the true cause of a
sentiment of beauty and the correct general viewpoint can be identified. Hume’s
solution to this problem can be constructed from his discussion of taste and its
standard, which forms the backbone of his essay on criticism—’Of the Standard of
Taste’. Our discussion of his solution should be postponed to Part III. Before that, a
brief account of how a judgement of beauty is made should be provided.
As in the case of moral judgements, sympathy also plays an essential role in a
judgement of beauty. As noted above, a specific general viewpoint should be adopted
in a judgement of beauty. In ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, this viewpoint is held to be
that of the intended audience of an artwork (E-ST, p. 276). 10 Therefore, a critic has
to imagine herself as a member of the intended audience. This is achieved by
sympathy. In Chapter 4, four steps have been distinguished. The first step is the
formation of an idea of the pleasure or pain of the intended audience. In some cases,
there are no direct observations of their reaction to the artwork in question. The
formation of the idea of the pleasure or pain of the intended audience is made
possible by the critic’s knowledge of the relevant facts, such as the details of the age
and culture. Such knowledge allows the critic to achieve a general understanding of
the object in the same way as the intended audience, and to form the same idea of
that object. The critic’s imagination will then naturally move from this idea to an
idea of pleasure or pain in accord with the general rules in her own mind. Besides,
there can be cases in which the critic has a chance to directly observe the intended
audience’s reaction to the artwork. Given the resemblance between every human
10

More detail will be provided in Chapter 12.
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being, the critic infers from the expression of the intended audience to an idea of
their pleasure or pain. The direct observation of the intended audience’s reaction
strengthens the idea of their pleasure formed on the basis of general rules.
Once the idea of their pleasure or pain is formed, the process of sympathy goes
on. The idea of pleasure or pain is enlivened by the force and vivacity of the critic’s
lively impression of her own self, through the three principles of association between
the corresponding idea of herself and her idea of the intended audience. As a result,
the idea of the pleasure or pain of the intended audience becomes that very pleasure
or pain. Based on the sentiment thus felt, a judgement of beauty is made. Ideally the
critic’s pleasure or pain would be as strong as that of the intended audience, but as
we have already seen near the end of Chapter 4, how much force or vivacity is
communicated depends on how close the critic’s idea of herself and her idea of the
intended audience are associated by the three natural relations. Therefore, unless the
critic is herself a member of the intended audience, the pleasure or pain felt would
seldom be as strong as that of the intended audience. However, when the critic learns
how to use general terms such as ‘beauty’ in a language, she also learns at the same
time the effects such natural relations would have on the sentiment acquired through
sympathy. Therefore, although her sentiment might not be perfectly correct, at least
the language used in giving her judgement can be corrected to offset the variable
effect of the natural relations.
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Part III
‘Of the Standard of Taste’
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Chapter 8
A Summary of ‘Of the Standard of Taste’
Hume starts his essay ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ with a discussion of the variety of
taste. This variety can be found within one’s circle of acquaintances, and it is more
obvious among people in different countries and ages. However, beneath this
appearance, the variety is indeed still greater. Some apparent agreement is in fact
merely verbal, because in every language there are general evaluative terms which
are used in order to express praise or blame by all competent users of that language;
but if we attend to the particular applications of such terms, we can find that they are
applied in very different ways by different people. 11
Hume goes on to tell us that ‘[t]hose who found morality on sentiment, more
than on reason, are inclined to comprehend ethics under the former observation’
(E-ST, p. 266). After an illustration of a similar case in morality, he comments that
‘[t]he merit of delivering true general precepts in ethics is indeed very small’ (E-ST,
p. 268). This follows from the observation that verbal agreement can conceal the
underlying disagreement concerning the application of such evaluative terms. What
is really important is the application of such terms, which implies our praise or blame
of the character or action in question, but not agreement merely on the evaluative
import of such terms as linguistic items. Therefore, Hume continues:
That people, who invented the word charity, and used it in a good sense,
inculcated more clearly and much more efficaciously, the precept, be
charitable, than any pretended legislator or prophet, who should insert
such a maxim in his writings. (ibid.)
11

As Hume moves on, we can see that his presentation of the variety of taste here somehow distorts
the actual situation. The fact is rather that despite such a variety, it can also be observed that there is
no radical change in people’s taste:
The same HOMER, who pleased at ATHENS and ROME two thousand years ago, is still
admired at PARIS and at LONDON. (E-ST, p. 271)
In contrast, Hume observes that in the case of speculative opinions:
These are in continual flux and revolution. The son embraces a different system from the
father. Nay, there scarcely is any man, who can boast of great constancy and uniformity in
this particular. (E-ST, p. 283)
It seems Hume is deliberately selective here, as a rhetorical strategy, in order to build up the tension
which is to be relieved by his demonstration later in the essay of how the variety of taste is
constrained and stabilised.
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To use the word ‘charity’ in a good sense is to apply it in accordance with our
‘just sentiment of morals’ (E-ST, p. 267). By using it justly in society, my praise of a
charitable action would lead others to appreciate the virtue of that action; and my
repeated just applications of the word ‘charity’ provide a basis on which the others
could have their sentiments be connected, by certain general rules, to the kind of
actions which are charitable. The effect of such a concrete model can narrow down
the variety of moral sentiments within our society, and this effect cannot be achieved
through merely ‘delivering true general precepts’. This reflection on the case of
morality shows that, despite the obvious variety in moral sentiments, there is
nonetheless a certain way in which we can narrow down this variety, and achieve a
certain degree of agreement. Hume’s reader would then wonder: is there any similar
way to reduce the variety of taste?
In the presence of the variety of taste, ‘[i]t is natural for us to seek a Standard of
Taste’ (E-ST, p. 268). By reference to such a standard, different sentiments could be
reconciled, or at least be confirmed or condemned. 12 This seems to follow from his
view that human beings have a natural propensity to form and follow general rules,
or in other words, a propensity (a) to find out the regularities underlying our
experience, and (b) to regulate our life in a principled way. This propensity motivates
us to seek a standard of taste, that is, to find out the regularity in our aesthetic life, so
that we can regulate our related activities accordingly.
However, that we have this natural tendency does not imply the existence of
such a standard, nor does it imply our ability to find it even if it exists. This sceptical
position is supported by a species of philosophy, which appeals to the non-referential
nature of sentiments. The thought here is that since sentiments do not refer to
anything beyond themselves, and are always real when felt, in one sense they are ‘all
right’. This line of thought also applies to the case of beauty, as beauty is a kind of
sentiment. Therefore, when taste is evaluated in terms of the sentiments aroused, the
fact that sentiments are ‘all right’ means that there is no standard of taste. This view
is labelled as ‘the principle of the natural equality of taste’, and concurs with the
common sense maxim that de gustibus non disputandum est.

12

There are some other ways to read this passage. See Section D of Chapter 14 for an evaluation of
the main proposals.
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If there is only one species of common sense, the sceptical position above might
be admitted as a truthful analysis of human nature, but this is not Hume’s position on
the matter. At least in the realm of art criticism, we can find cases like those in which
Ogilby and Milton, or Bunyan and Addison are compared. The principle of the
natural equality of taste is found to be forgotten in such cases, where general
agreements concerning the comparative merit of one author over that of another one
are observed, and opposite sentiments are rejected as ‘absurd and ridiculous’ (E-ST,
p. 269). This shows that at least in some cases of art criticism, it is commonsensical
that ‘the taste of all individuals is not on an equal footing’ (E-ST, p.279), and can be
evaluated.
The discussion of these two species of common sense completes the
stage-setting of the essay. Hume would surely not think that all commonsensical
views are rationally justifiable, but the fact that they are generally held indicates that
there is probably some feature of our common human nature which is responsible for
the pre-philosophical acceptance of such views, and hence this fact should be
explained in Hume’s science of human nature. Whilst a short philosophical analysis
of the first species of common sense has been provided, the second one is at this
stage only provided as a piece of unanalysed observation: only a fool doubts that
Milton is greater than Ogilby. We are left with the questions: why do we have the
second species of common sense? Which human phenomena are relevant? What is
the nature of these relevant human phenomena? And most importantly, does it show
that there is a certain mechanism which reduces the variety of taste? The remaining
parts of the essay are dedicated to these questions, and their answer hinges on the
idea of a standard of taste. 13

13

Being set up in this way, we can see that, contrary to the view of many commentators, Hume need
not show that universal agreement is achievable, nor does he need to show that we can always decide
whose judgement of beauty is better. Indeed, the second species of common sense is a very weak
negative claim. It just shows that in some cases, the principle of the nature equality of taste does not
hold, and that certain evaluative judgements of taste can be made. This is far weaker than the claim
that there can in fact be universal agreement in such cases—not even in the examples used, as there is
a disagreement between those being ridiculed and those who ridicule them. Misunderstanding of this
sort might explain why people might be surprised by the weak claim Hume makes later that:
It is sufficient for our present purpose, if we have proved, that the taste of all individuals
is not upon an equal footing, and that some men in general, however difficult to be
particularly pitched upon, will be acknowledged by universal sentiment to have a
preference above others. (E-ST, p. 279)
This sounds too weak to those people who attribute a far more ambitious project to Hume.
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The rest of the essay can be separated into three parts. The first part explicates
the second species of common sense by showing in what sense the tastes of different
people are not on an equal footing. This explication culminates at the identification
of the soundness of the state of organ as the factor which explains why the taste of
different people is unequal. The second part is a development of the finding in the
previous part. It discusses five causes of defective taste, from which an idea of true
judge is provided, and their joint verdict is identified as the true standard of taste and
beauty. This shows that ‘some men in general ... will be acknowledged by universal
sentiment to have a preference above others’ (ibid.). Therefore, Hume has shown that
there is a mechanism by which the variety of taste is reduced. The third part focuses
on two sources of blameless variations of sentiment. This discussion delineates how
far the second species of common sense holds.
With this overview of the whole essay in hand, we can move on to see what
Hume tells us after he has set the stage for the ensuring discussion. Since the
examples by which he introduces the second species of common sense are drawn
from art criticism, a reflection on this kind of human activity might reveal more
about such a commonsensical view. One of the salient features of art criticism is that
it involves rules of art, and that is why Hume starts his reflection by considering the
role of rules of art in art criticism.
According to Hume, rules of art are generalisations of experience ‘concerning
what has been universally found to please in all countries and in all ages’ (E-ST, p.
269). He finds that artworks such as poetry ‘must be confined by rules of art,
discovered to the author either by genius or observation’ (E-ST, p. 270). Art criticism
is rule-governed, for it is one of critic’s jobs to identify the quality which pleases
according to true rules of art. However, it is also observed that our sentiment seems
not to always agree with general rules. The observation of such discrepancies might
then serve as an objection to criticism in general, because it suggests that art
criticism is thus an activity which appeals to rules which are partly based on
sentiments, while the production of sentiments is not really governed by rules. Hume
rejects this objection by claiming that this disagreement between the sentiment
actually felt and the sentiment predicted according to a particular rule of art can only
be an objection to that rule. ‘If [some qualities] are found to please, they cannot be
faults; let the pleasure, which they produce, be ever so unexpected and
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unaccountable’ (ibid.). The rule should be revised according to the new evidence
given by the sentiments. Treating the problem in this way, the status of sentiment as
the ultimate evidence of an object’s power to please is emphasised.
Here it seems that Hume is still trapped in the same predicament, as the sceptic
could happily agree with all these claims about art criticism. The assertion of the
authority of sentiments as evidence might even seem to support the natural equality
of taste, as it suggests that sentiments are not to be corrected by rules of art. However,
this is just an appearance. The next step in Hume’s essay reveals a blind spot of the
sceptical view. Hume does not disagree with the sceptical view regarding the
non-referential nature of sentiment and hence the lack of a standard in this sense; but
instead of focusing on the product of taste, he draws our attention to an aspect
omitted by the sceptics—the capricious operation of the mind, including but not
restricted to mental taste. Although he does not write explicitly in the same way,
Hume’s treatment of the mind in relation to taste is in the same spirit as his treatment
of the imagination in his discussion of causal belief. There, reflective general rules
concerning the operation of the imagination help us to decide when the imagination
operates in accordance to its natural regularity. Similarly, concerning the operation
of mental taste, general rules could be formed for the decision of when its operation
conforms to its natural principles. ‘A perfect serenity of mind, a recollection of
thought, a due attention to the object’ are requisite for the regular operation of the
mind, and only when it operates in this way would ‘the beauties, which are naturally
fitted to excite agreeable sentiments, immediately display their energy’ (E-ST, p.
271).
It is now clear that what is at stake is the regularity of the operations of the mind.
This regularity might be obscured by ‘all the caprices of mode and fashion, all the
mistakes of ignorance and envy’ (ibid.). In order to establish general rules which
correctly capture this regularity, it is a good idea to consider the durable admiration
received by canonical artworks which pass the test of time, for it is more likely that
people are pleased by such masterpieces in accordance with the natural principles of
taste, instead of by some transient factors.
In brief, we should distinguish between a sound state and a defective state of the
mind, and only when it is in the sound state could the sentiment actually felt be relied
on as evidence, from which we judge the beauty of an artwork and derive general
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rules of art. When we are not merely talking about the quality of our private
sentiment, but try to judge the beauty of artworks, our own mental taste has to be
judged first. The second species of common sense which rejects ‘the principle of the
natural equality of taste’ is thus analysed to be a view concerning the soundness of
the operation of taste. It is supported by our ability to judge our taste in terms of it
operation. 14
With the distinction between sound and defective states in place, Hume moves
on in the next part of his essay to substantiate this distinction by discussing five traits
which constitute a sound state. These five traits will be discussed later in Chapter 10.
Hume summarises his discussion of them in this way:
Strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected
by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this
valuable character [of true judge]; and the joint verdict of such, wherever
they are to be found, is the true standard of taste and beauty. (E-ST, p.
278-279)
The last step in Hume’s explication of his idea of a true judge is a response to
the worry that the true judge might not be found, and hence that it is impossible for
us to find the standard of taste. Hume replies that whether a critic is a true judge is a
matter of fact, and is to be decided by arguments. Moreover, he thinks that it is
sufficient for the present purpose, that is, to provide a philosophical analysis of the
14

Nick Zangwill wonders why there is a disparity in terms of normative force between judgements of
beauty and ugliness and judgements of niceness and nastiness of food (Zangwill 2001, p. 155). He
says, ‘[a]s far as judgments of niceness and nastiness are concerned, anything goes’ (ibid.). Just like
beauty and ugliness, in the cases of niceness and nastiness we normally would not expect that no one
would agree with us. However, when there is somebody who disagrees and gives a different
judgement, we might at first be a little bit surprised and ask that person to taste the food again; but if
her judgement does not change, we would not insist on getting her to agree with us.
Zangwill asks that if, according to Hume, the soundness of mental taste explains why the former
kind of judgements is normative, why not also say the same thing in the case of bodily taste? It seems
Hume is committed to the implausible view that the latter kind of judgements should be as normative
as the former one.
Zangwill’s worry arises because he does not consider the courtesy use of ‘beauty’. ‘Beauty’ in
this sense is a term in general language, and this leads to the demand of the adoption of a general
viewpoint. However, ‘niceness’ and ‘nastiness’ do not seem to be the same kind of terms, and are
more similar to terms like ‘pleasing’, which are used to report purely subjective sensations. Probably
it is this last requirement which explains the difference between the normative force in the case of
mental taste and that of bodily taste.
There is a further complication here, which has seldom been noticed. In the famous wine tasting
case drawn from Don Quixote (E-ST, p. 272), although it is also a case of bodily taste, there seems to
be a much higher degree of normativity carried by the judgements of the two kinsmen. Why is there
such a big difference in the normative force within cases of bodily taste? The answer to this question
is tied to Hume’s idea of general rules of art, and so we will return to this question in the next chapter
(n. 15).
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second species of common sense, to have shown (1) ‘that the taste of all individuals
is not upon an equal footing’, and (2) ‘that some men in general ... will be
acknowledged by universal sentiment to have a preference above others’ (E-ST, p.
279). The first one is shown by the distinction between sound and defective states;
the second one is shown by the idea of a true judge. Also, he adds that the difficulty
of finding the standard of taste ‘is not so great as it is represented’ (ibid.). This is
suggested by the historical observation that matters of taste are less liable to change.
Hume explains as follow:
Many men, when left to themselves, have but a faint and dubious
perception of beauty, who yet are capable of relishing any fine stroke,
which is pointed out to them. Every convert to the admiration of the real
poet or orator is the cause of some new conversion. (E-ST, p. 280)
Such conversion narrows down the difference between people’s taste, and results in
the stability observed in matters of taste.
In the last part of the essay, Hume turns to discuss the two blameless sources of
variations of sentiment, so as to prevent his readers from being too optimistic to
think that all variety of taste could be eliminated. The variations discussed here are
blameless because:
[They] are not sufficient indeed to confound all the boundaries of beauty
and deformity, but will often serve to produce a difference in the degrees
of our approbation and blame. (ibid.)
These variations are those which concern the degree of approbation and blame, but
not those in cases where the same artwork is praised and blamed by different people.
One source is the internal frame of mind, or ‘the different humours of particular
men’; the other one is the external situation, including ‘the particular manners and
opinions of our age and country’ (ibid.). Although such variations are inevitable, and
no standard can allow us to correct them, an educated person could make allowance
for such variations when she judges the beauty of an artwork, and in so doing, a true
judgement of beauty can still be made. A detailed explanation will be provided in
Chapter 12.
There is a complication concerning the second source—the external situation. If
there is a difference between the moral principle held by the author and that of ours,
as in a poem where a character which is evil according to our moral standard does
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not receive proper punishment, this is not an instance of blameless variation. Hume
writes:
I cannot, nor is it proper I should, enter into such sentiments; and however
I may excuse the poet, on account of the manners of his age, I never can
relish the composition. (E-ST, p. 282)
This view is not sufficiently explained. An explanation will be proposed in Chapter
13. This complication affects Hume’s treatment of another factor of external
situation, that is, religious principles. Normally, since reason ‘is not hearkened to in
religious matters’ (E-ST, p. 283), speculative errors in religious principles are the
most excusable. However, if an artist is bigoted or superstitious, so that her religious
principles imposes a set of moral principles different from ours on her artwork, this
will then be treated in the same way as in cases involving different moral principles,
and not to be counted as blameless.
This discussion on the two sources of blameless variations reminds us that even
when we talk about the quality of beauty of artworks, rather than merely our own
private sentiment of beauty, there are still some inevitable variations in our sentiment.
As a result, when we judge the beauty of an artwork, if we are aware of the presence
of such variations, then we should not expect or demand a total agreement on the
sentiments we felt. In such cases, as long as we have made appropriate allowance for
the blameless variations, a verbal agreement on the pronounced judgement of beauty
is all we can achieve.
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Chapter 9
Art Criticism
Art criticism is more than merely judging the beauty of artworks. It also involves the
identification of the quality which causes the sentiment of beauty, the determination
of the correct general viewpoint to be adopted, and the ranking of artworks within
their genre. In virtue of these activities, art critics aim to discover and bring other
people to appreciate the true beauty of different artworks, or in Hume’s terminology,
to feel the sentiment of beauty naturally caused by different artworks. This follows
from the nature of judgements of beauty. As a judgement of beauty concerns whether
an object really possesses a generally accessible quality, and the only sensible effect
of such a quality is a private feeling of pleasure, a critic can only justify her
judgements by bringing other people to see the beauty of that object themselves. This
means that art criticism is essentially a social practice, as the success of a critic
depends on whether other people can share her sentiment of beauty.
Critics need to communicate their sentiment with other people, including other
critics and ordinary people, through discussion of the beauty of artworks. As people
often disagree on the beauty of an artwork, such discussions should not be conceived
as any single person’s attempt to impose her own sentiment on other people. Instead,
everyone involved in the discussion tries to convince the others to share their own
sentiment through something similar to rational arguments.
The precise nature of such ‘arguments’ will be explained soon. What we should
now pay attention to is the reciprocity of the discussion involved in art criticism.
Each critic should be sensitive to the reactions of other people. If a critic failed to
convince another person, instead of insisting on her sentiment, she should reflect on
her own judgement, to see if it is rather her sentiment that is faulty. No fair criticism
of ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ should make use of examples which treat art critics as
people who are totally confident of their sentiment, and unwilling to step back and
reflect on their own judgement.
Sometimes criticisms of the essay assume that the decision whether a critic’s
judgement should be accepted depends on the establishment of her status as a true
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judge, or at least a better judge. However, for various reasons, it might be argued that
such a status could not be rationally established, so that the critic’s judgement could
not be rationally accepted. As a result, everyone can just refuse to try to share the
others’ sentiment. They can insist on their own one, just because of the infirmity of
the other’s status as a critic. Confronted by such criticism, Hume would probably
reply that the same reason which shows the infirmity of the other’s status also holds
for one’s own self. This universal infirmity should rather cause critics to be more
humble and more willing to experience different sentiments. When a critic shares
another critic’s sentiment, a valid ground of comparison between different
sentiments could then be found, because the comparison is no longer between
sentiments of different critics whose status is not established, but between different
sentiments within one and the same person. With this illustration, it should be clear
now why the reciprocity of the discussion between art critics should be stressed.
As the aim of art criticism is to discover and bring other people to feel true
beauty, it is not enough to convince the others that something is beautiful for a
certain group of critics to which they might not belong. A person might utter a
statement ‘this artwork is beautiful’ without having that very sentiment which can
ground this utterance. This can be illustrated by the distinction between is-statement
and ought-statement discussed at the end of Chapter 5. The statement ‘this artwork is
beautiful’ might be analogous to an ought-statement, in the sense that it is made on
the basis of the sentiment of beauty actually felt. On the other hand, it might be just
an is-statement which concerns the general taste:
Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of
taste and sentiment. Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more
properly than perceived. Or if we reason concerning it, and endeavour to
fix its standard, we regard a new fact, to wit, the general taste of mankind,
or some such fact, which may be the object of reasoning and enquiry.
(EHU 12.33, my italics)
It is certainly not the aim of art criticism to lead a person to merely make a claim
about ‘the general taste of mankind’. Therefore, in order to bring other people to
appreciate the beauty of an artwork, art critics have to guide them in a certain way in
appreciating the artwork, so that they could have a genuine sentiment of beauty
aroused by it. They determine the viewpoint to be adopted on the basis of their
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art-historical and cultural knowledge. Hume requires that the general viewpoint to be
adopted should be the viewpoint of the intended audience (E-ST, p. 276). He does
not argue for this requirement. It is reasonable to question why that viewpoint should
be privileged, as it is not the only general viewpoint available. More on this topic
will be said in Chapter 12.
Besides, critics need to bring other people to attend to the quality which
produces the sentiment of beauty in a certain manner. Sometimes, a person might
perceive an artwork from the required viewpoint, but still not feel the sentiment of
beauty it would naturally produce, because she could not duly attend to the quality
which is responsible for the artwork’s beauty. The critic’s solution of this problem
can be constructed from Hume’s discussion of how to silence a bad critic (E-ST, p.
273-274). A critic first draws some general rule of art from masterpieces in which
that quality is ‘presented singly and in high degree’ and produces the sentiment of
beauty. Then she asks the opponent whom she wants to convince to see that quality’s
influence on these masterpieces. As that quality is presented singly and in high
degree there, it is much easier for that person to notice its influence. Once the
opponent agrees on such a general rule, her imagination has been sharpened by those
masterpieces to be more sensitive to the influence of that quality. Then, the critic
tries to demonstrate that the very same principle has the same influence on the
artwork in question. Since the critic’s interlocutor is now more sensitive to that
quality, she might then be able to notice the influence of it, and come to feel the
sentiment of beauty. Thus, the critic has succeeded in convincing her audience, in the
sense that this person can now judge the beauty of that artwork on her own,
according to the new sentiment she feels in virtue of her improved sensitivity. The
comparison is strictly speaking made between two different judgements made by the
same person, rather than between the original judgement of the opponent and that
made by the critic. It should be noted that the discussion as presented here does not
depend on the prior establishment of the critic as the one having a superior taste; on
the contrary, it is only after the person has been convinced that the superiority of the
taste of the critic would be established. The endorsement of a critic as having
superior taste is implied in the acceptance of her superior judgement of beauty.
However, the critic might fail to convince her opponent. Perhaps she has
misidentified the cause of her sentiment of beauty, and hence although she has
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produced a general rule of art correctly on the basis of those masterpieces, the rule is
simply irrelevant to the artworks in question, as her sentiment of beauty is actually
caused by some other quality. Therefore, even if the opponent can see the influence
of that general rule on those masterpieces, and her imagination is then more sensitive
to that quality, she is not thus in any sense aided by the critic to see the beauty of that
artwork. In such a case, the critic has a reason to reflect on her sentiment, and
perhaps she would then discover some faults on her side, which prevents the proper
identification of the true cause of her sentiment. This brings us back to the question
raised near the end of Chapter 7, concerning how the true cause of a person’s
sentiment of beauty is identified.
The solution to this problem involves two components. First, we need an
account of how a critic can determine which qualities of the artwork are possible
causes of her sentiment; second, we should also show that the critic has the ability to
identify the true cause among these possible causes. We start with the first
component.
As mentioned before, a sentiment of beauty does not represent its cause.
Therefore, in order to know what its possible cause is, we need something external to
this sentiment. Since the identification of the cause of a sentiment of beauty is in fact
a causal judgement, we can easily construct an account for such an identification by
considering what Hume’s view of causal judgement is.
Basically, a causal judgement is a judgement made according to the general rule
formed on experience. When we observe a constant conjunction of two things—a
certain quality and a sentiment of beauty, our imagination naturally forms a general
rule connecting them, so that the appearance of one naturally introduces the idea of
another. If the first one is always (or in general) followed by the second one, the first
one is then considered as the cause of the second one.
Accordingly, a quality is considered as a cause of a sentiment of beauty if it ‘has
been universally found to please in all countries and in all ages’ (E-ST, p. 269). The
general rule formed in this case is a rule of art, which connects empirically our
private sentiment of beauty to a publicly accessible quality in artworks. With such a
rule of art, a critic can add more substance to her judgement of beauty by pointing to
a particular quality in an artwork as responsible for its beauty, so that she is thus able
to do more than merely say that the artwork is beautiful. However, artworks are not
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all beautiful in the same way. There are many qualities which have been found to
cause us to have a sentiment of beauty. Therefore, a qualified critic should have a
stock of rules of art, each of which suggests a different quality as a possible cause of
a sentiment beauty. Perhaps in some case, the artwork in consideration possesses
only one quality which resembles exactly a possible cause of a sentiment of beauty.
In the absence of other possibilities, a critic can then conclude that this quality is the
true cause of her sentiment. However, such a simple case probably never obtains, or
is at least very infrequent. Most often an artwork possesses a number of qualities,
each of which resembles imperfectly a possible cause of a sentiment of beauty. The
imperfect resemblances imply that the rules of art available might not apply to these
qualities. Perhaps only some of them really please, and each of them pleases to a
different degree. Confronted with this messy situation, a critic needs something in
addition to her stock of rules of art to correctly identify the true cause(s) of her
sentiment. What might that be?
One might suggest that the critic can use her reason to make the decision, but
this cannot be the case. A sentiment of beauty is produced by a highly particular
combination of various factors. The same quality does not please in all situations:
A very small variation of the object, even where the same qualities are
preserved, will destroy a sentiment. Thus, the same beauty, transferred to a
different sex, excites no amorous passion, where nature is not extremely
perverted. (EPM 5, n. 17)
However, reasonings from experience involve the use of general rules. Even in cases
where such rules are formulated explicitly so that we can employ them in our
reasoning, their application always allows a certain degree of flexibility, so that they
are applied also to cases which resemble imperfectly the original experience on
which we form such rules. In other words, our reasoning is too general to help us in
making judgements sensitive enough to the particularities that matter in the
production of the sentiment of beauty. Therefore, our reason cannot help us
determine which quality is the true cause of our sentiment of beauty.
This reply immediately invites an objection. When Hume talks about the use of
general rules of art in determining the delicacy of a person’s mental taste, he says:
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And if the same qualities, in a continued composition and in a smaller
degree, affect not the organs with a sensible delight or uneasiness, we
exclude the person from all pretensions to this delicacy. (E-ST, p. 273)
This passage suggests that the same qualities should always have the same effects,
which seems to contradict the above reply. A possible way to reconcile the two
quoted passages above is to determine what Hume means by ‘the same qualities’.
Perhaps Hume has conflated two different kinds of terms in his talk of
qualities—purely descriptive terms and partly evaluative terms. The latter are used to
refer to qualities our perceptions of which are ‘coloured’ by the sentiments of beauty
or deformity they elicit in us. These qualities might also be captured by a complete
physical description of the object, just like Euclid’s full description of a circle which
misses nothing but its beauty (EPM APP 1.14). Yet when a different object is
considered, the same partly evaluative term would pick out some other qualities
which might not be referred to by the same descriptive terms. How exactly these two
kinds of terms are related is a serious issue, but we do not need to get involved into
this trouble. We can proceed by simply noticing that probably in the passage quoted
from the second Enquiry above, Hume has in mind the qualities referred to by purely
descriptive terms, while in the passage from ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, he is
thinking of those our perception of which are coloured by our sentiment of beauty.
Qualities of the first kind, such as a certain narrative structure, can produce different
sentiments of beauty or deformity when they are found in different objects.
Therefore, in some cases, a small variation in the purely descriptive qualities an
object, except its narrative structure, would destroy its beauty. In contrast, qualities
of the second kind, such as a liveliness of style, cease to be referred to by the same
partly evaluative term if their non-evaluative elements have had produced a different
sentiment of beauty. Therefore, insofar as the term ‘liveliness of style’ is used, even
when the quality referred to is found ‘in a continued composition and in a smaller
degree’, a person with delicate taste should still have the same but weaker sentiment
of beauty aroused.
It is of course possible that Hume is inconsistent between different works, but
we do not seem to have any conclusive evidence for or against this charge. However,
this speculation does illuminate something important in our interpretation of his ‘Of
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the Standard of Taste’ regarding his view of the role of general rules of art, and
relatedly, how art criticism works.
Hume starts his reflection on art criticism with a paragraph on general rules of
art which should be read carefully. A little bit historical background can help us
appreciate that succinct discussion. During Hume’s days, there were two main views
on criticism. The ‘rule-based neo-classical critical theory’ held that the value of an
artwork depends on its conformity to a set of rules; while another view, based on
Longinus’ On the Sublime, held that the merit of some great ancient artworks
consists rather in their breaking the rules (Friday 1998, p. 548-549). Hume’s thought
differs from both of these views. On the one hand, he disagrees with the latter view
in denying that artworks can please ‘by their transgressions of rule or order’; on the
other hand, he disagrees with the neo-classicists in that he allows that rules of art can
be rejected on the basis of sentiment (E-ST, p. 270). However, provided with only
these two negative claims, the readers of the essay are still in the dark about Hume’s
thought on the role of rules of art.
Commentators of Hume usually assume without argument that Hume thinks that
critics judge the value of artworks by checking their conformity to rules of art, but
this does not seem to be the truth. Hume’s position seems to be rather that, instead of
using rules of art to infer from causes to effects, art critics use rules of art to help
them identify the causes of their sentiments of beauty. There are two arguments
which can be offered against the common reading. First, Hume explicitly holds that
sentiment is the more authoritative source of evidence than rules of art at the end of
his paragraph on rules of art (ibid.). A natural consequence of this position is to say
that critics should ensure that their taste is sound enough to be trustworthy, rather
than to put aside the established authority of sentiment and to ask the critics to reason
according to rules of art.
Second, if Hume really thinks that a critic can reason from the presence of a
quality to a judgement of beauty, the critic should be able to identify the quality
before she makes her judgement. This brings in the question concerning which kind
of terms, purely descriptive or partly evaluative, are used in referring to that quality.
If a partly evaluative term is used, the quality referred to can only be discerned if a
person has already been able to see its beauty, and thus the rule of art is redundant.
But the case is no better if a purely descriptive term is used. As shown in the first
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paragraph of this chapter, a critic can justify her judgement of beauty only if she can
bring the others to share her sentiment. If it is allowed that a critic can reason from
the presence of a purely descriptive quality to a judgement of beauty, then either it is
possible to justify a judgement of beauty without anyone having a corresponding
sentiment, which directly contradicts what we found previously, or we should
conclude that this kind of reasoning does not justify judgements of beauty, so that
there seems to be no point to reason in this way. None of the above options sounds
attractive, so we would like to know if there is any better option which fits with
Hume’s thought.
Earlier in this chapter we have already discussed a better option, that is, the
thesis that a rule of art helps a critic identify the true cause of her sentiment of beauty.
We will not repeat the details of that discussion here. In order to complete the present
digression on the role of rules of art, we just need to supplement that discussion with
a demonstration that this suggestion fits well with Hume’s text.
In ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, Hume illustrates explicitly only twice how rules
of art are of use, both of which have been mentioned earlier in this chapter. We start
with the second of the two. Hume shows us how to silence a bad critic. As we have
seen above, the rule is used to draw the bad critic’s attention to the right quality in
some masterpieces. This is indeed just a special application of the identification of
the quality which causes a sentiment of beauty.
When we go back a little bit in the same paragraph, we find the first place
where Hume shows the use of rules of art. There he uses such rules to test the
delicacy of taste. The rules are drawn from ‘established models’, where the relevant
quality is ‘presented singly and in a high degree’, so that we do not need to isolate it
from a mixture of various qualities. The absence of other possible causes of the
sentiment of beauty allows us to easily draw a rule of art from such artworks. Thus
having identified a quality as a cause of a sentiment of beauty, Hume continues, we
can test the delicacy of a person’s taste with a composition in which the same quality
is found in a mixture and in a smaller degree. In this case, it is obvious that no
reasoning is involved. Hume goes on to claim that:
To produce these general rules or avowed patterns of composition is like
finding the key with the leathern thong; which justified the verdict of
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SANCHO’s kinsmen, and confounded those pretended judges who had
condemned them. (E-ST, p. 273)
Both the rules and the key help people identify the true cause. One of the kinsmen
notices the taste of iron, but strictly speaking, the cause of that taste is identified only
when the key is found (similarly for the taste of leather detected by the other
kinsman). Readers of Hume’s essay tend to connect the taste of iron too close with
the key, without mentioning the quality of being contaminated by iron object
in-between. This, I suggest, might explain why Hume’s analogy between the rules
and the key is misleading. If we take this intermediary component into consideration,
then we can understand better how the analogy holds.
Actually, besides being contaminated by some iron object (the key), there can
be other possible causes of the taste of iron—for example, the hogshead might be
contaminated by blood (objective), or the kinsman has a small bleeding wound in his
mouth (subjective). These alternative possibilities are not rejected before the
discovery of the key. Therefore, the finding of the key helps the kinsmen and the
townsmen identify the true cause of the taste of iron in the hogshead. Their
judgements are justified because the presence of the key with the leathern thong
shows that there is really an objective quality—namely, being contaminated by
objects made of iron and leather—that is possessed by the wine. 15

15

In a footnote in last chapter (n. 14), we found a difference in the degree of normativity between
judgements of niceness and nastiness and judgements made by the two kinsmen. Here we can see the
reason. If ‘niceness’ and ‘nastiness’, as in Zangwill’s usage, are in fact not terms in general language,
then when someone says that some food is nice or nasty, she is just expressing what she feels, but not
asserting that the food has a specific generally accessible quality called ‘niceness’ or ‘nastiness’. Of
course there is a certain quality—or, we might say, a certain je ne sais quoi—in the food that is
responsible for the pleasant or unpleasant taste, but such a quality is not thus identified by the
judgement of niceness or nastiness.
In contrast, when one of the kinsmen says that there is a taste of iron in the wine, he is in a
certain sense pointing to the existence of some specific substance in the wine. ‘A taste of iron’ does
not just refer to a particular sensation, but also ties that sensation to what is found to cause it in
general. In other words, ‘a taste of iron’ can be viewed as shorthand of ‘a taste generally caused by
objects contaminated by iron’ (this is a partly evaluative term as the word ‘contaminated’ is used).
Operating in the background is a general rule connecting a certain quality to a particular kind of
sensation. The quality ‘being contaminated by iron’ is an objective matter, and hence not every
opinion is right. Therefore, the judgement of the kinsman carries a normative force that is absent in
judgements of niceness and nastiness.
Similarly, linguistic constructions like ‘the beauty of expression’, ‘the beauty of structure’, etc.
should be understood in the same way as ‘a taste of iron’. They are also terms the existence of which
presupposes a corresponding general rule—in this case, a rule of art—connecting a certain quality to a
sentiment of beauty. The role played by such a general rule is also of identifying the cause of the
sentiment. This observation, if sound, provides further support to the interpretation developed here.
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Analogously, when a person is pleased by an artwork, there are different
possible causes of her sentiment. Beside the presence of a quality of beauty, perhaps
she might be under the influence of some defective external situation (objective), or
she has been set in a joyous mood by some irrelevant factors (subjective). However,
in this case, not only is she unable to ascertain the true cause of her sentiment before
the ‘general rules or avowed patterns of composition’ are produced, but she might
even be unable to include the true cause in the list of possible causes, as she might
not have experienced that quality before, and hence could not come up with it as a
possibility. The rules allow the critic to come up with a list of qualities, among other
factors, such as internal and external defects, as the possible causes. In cases where
there is only one possibility, the critic can conclude that the quality identified by the
rule is the true cause, and her judgement can be justified, as she can use the same
rule to convince other critics. 16 As for cases where more than one possibility can be
found, the critic would need to make a decision as to which one is the true cause.
This remark closes this digression on the role of rules of art, and carries us forward
to the second piece of an explanation of how a critic can identify the true cause of
her sentiment of beauty.
In the Treatise, we find in a footnote the following passage:
No questions in philosophy are more difficult, than when a number of
causes present themselves for the same phænomenon, to determine which
is the principal and predominant. There seldom is any very precise
argument to fix our choice, and men must be contented to be guided by a
kind of taste or fancy, arising from analogy, and a comparison of similar
instances. (T 3.2.3, n.1)
This passage suggests that it is one of the functions of our mental taste to identify the
true cause of a person’s sentiment of beauty. The idea seems to be that the sound
16

It is not clear whether there is any disanalogy here. In the wine tasting case, it seems the finding of
the key immediately justifies the kinsmen’s judgements; but in the case of criticism, the critic is
merely equipped with a rule which helps her convince the others and justifies her judgement. This
seems to be a significant difference, but perhaps it is not. We can easily imagine some people who
have no idea of what consequence the key would have to the hogshead, so that even after the key is
found, the kinsmen would still need to show further the influence of the presence of a key in a
hogshead to these people. Conversely, we might also imagine that for the quality identified by the rule,
were it to be pointed out, the other people would immediately be able to relish it, so that simply
producing the rule would constitute equally obvious evidence as finding the key. These two
possibilities show that the difference between the case of wine tasting and that of criticism is just a
difference in the degree of familiarity, and is not philosophically significant. Then, it sounds more
reasonable to say that there is no disanalogy here.
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operation of the mental taste enables a person to identify the true cause. As a result,
the need of making judgements of taste is introduced once again. It should now be
obvious how important it is to discuss taste and the standard of taste in a
philosophical reflection on art criticism. Taste does not merely produce the sentiment
of beauty which could ground our judgement of beauty, it also singles out the true
cause of this sentiment, so that art critics could justify their judgement of beauty by
bringing other people to attend to the relevant quality and feel the same sentiment of
beauty. However, as mental taste does not always operate properly, art critics have to
reflectively judge the operation of their taste in order to ensure that their taste does
not mislead them to form wrong judgement or to single out the wrong cause of their
sentiment. Therefore, a standard of taste is required, so that they can judge their
taste. 17 Before we move on to the discussion of the nature of the standard of taste,
we should first examine what Hume means exactly by ‘true judge’.

17

Just like the case of ‘judgement of taste’ and ‘judgement of beauty’, most if not all commentators
of Hume’s ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ also do not distinguish ‘standard of taste’ from ‘standard of
beauty’. However, this distinction should better be drawn along a similar line as in the case of
‘judgement of taste’ and ‘judgement of beauty’: ‘standard of taste’ refers to a standard concerning the
soundness of the operation of the mental taste, and ‘standard of beauty’ refers to a standard
concerning whether something truly possesses a quality of beauty.
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Chapter 10
True Judges and Their Five Traits
It should be obvious that true judges play an important role in Hume’s account of the
standard of taste, as their joint verdict is ‘the true standard of taste and beauty’ (E-ST,
p. 278-279). True judges are those critics who have delicacy of taste, by which they
are ‘sensible of every beauty and every blemish, in any composition or discourse’
(E-ST, p. 274). Also, they have to be practiced, so that the power of their taste could
be fully executed. Moreover, in order to rank an artwork properly among those in the
same genre, true judges have to form comparisons. Besides, they should be free from
prejudice, and adopt the viewpoint of the intended audience. Lastly, they should
possess good sense, which enables them to check the influence of prejudice, to grasp
the relation between different parts of an artwork, to determine how well an artwork
has met its end, and to understand the reasonings involved in an artwork.
These five traits of true judges are sometimes held to be the marks by which
true judges are known. If this is true, then the question whether something is
beautiful could be solved by finding the true judges, and then asking for their joint
verdict on it. It would then follow that a person could have a correct belief that
something is beautiful without having to have any direct experience of it. The joint
verdict of true judges, as the true standard of taste and beauty, is the best testimony
of an object’s beauty; and if a person is justified to believe that some critics are true
judges, then she is also justified to believe in their joint verdict. This proposal might
sound attractive, and hence the question where true judges are to be found appears to
be crucial to art criticism.
However, this interpretation is probably wrong for two reasons. Firstly, it does
not fit well with the text. After his summary of the character of the true judges, and
the identification of their joint verdict as the true standard, Hume writes in the next
paragraph:
But where are such critics to be found? By what marks are they to be
known? How distinguish them from pretenders? These questions are
embarrassing; and seem to throw us back into the same uncertainty, from
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which, during the course of this essay, we have endeavoured to extricate
ourselves. (E-ST, p. 279)
If Hume really thinks that the five traits are the marks by which true judges are
known, then these questions are too simple to be embarrassing. It seems Hume is not
treating these traits as the marks of true judges.
Secondly, a reflection on the five traits shows that, when they are considered as
perfections, they cannot be known, and hence true judges could not be known by
them. We should look at each of them in turn.
Consider first the delicacy of taste. If a critic has a perfectly delicate taste, she is
sensible of every beauty and every blemish. That means in order to determine
whether a critic has this perfection, we have to be able to compare the beauties and
blemishes to which she is sensible to all of those indeed possessed by an artwork. If
the person’s responses track the work’s actual features, then this critic has a perfectly
delicate taste. However, this means we should first be able to detect all of the
beauties and blemishes of an object, before we can compare them with those sensed
by the critic. As a consequence, unless we have first ascertained that some other
critics have a perfectly delicate taste, we can never make the comparison and thus we
are unable to determine whether the critic in question has the same perfection.
However, in order to ascertain that the taste of these other critics is perfectly delicate,
we need still some other critics who have perfectly delicate taste. An infinite regress
is generated. An appeal to the ability in question could be justified only if it has
already been justified in a prior instance.
Worse still, even if we grant that we have perfectly delicate taste and that we are
capable of ascertaining that this is so, it is still impossible to make the comparison.
The sentiment caused by beauties and blemishes are just a certain kind of pleasure
and displeasure. Such sentiments do not represent anything, thus we could not
decisively infer from them to their causes. We have seen in Chapter 9 that the
identification of the cause of a sentiment is an ability of sound taste. This ability of
taste partly depends on its delicacy, since unless it is perfectly delicate, there might
be some qualities that escaped its attention, and thus our taste might not be able to
identify the true cause. Therefore we could only rely on our taste, which has been
assumed for the sake of argument to be perfectly delicate, to identify the true cause
of the sentiment. It seems we could not compare the beauty and blemish sensed by
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the critic with those actually possessed by the artwork and correctly identified by our
perfectly delicate taste, because unless we beg the question and assume that the taste
of that critic is perfectly delicate, we are not justified to think that she can identify
the true cause of her sentiment, and hence her verbal report of what she sees is not
trustworthy.
A perfectly practiced critic should be a person whose taste can no longer be
improved by practice. In order to determine whether a critic is perfectly practiced,
we should be able to determine if her taste could be further improved by more
practice. There seem to be only two possibilities. First, we might focus on the effect
of further practice. Perhaps we know that no more practice advantageous to the
critic’s taste is possible; but this kind of knowledge seems to be impossible. Since
whether further practice is advantageous could only be ascertained retrospectively,
and it seems always possible for a critic to engage in further practice, we can never
reach the temporal point at which we could acquire such a kind of knowledge. Or
second, we might focus on the current status of the taste of that critic. Perhaps we
know beforehand how such the taste of a perfectly practiced critic would be, and
then compare it with that of the critic in question. This leads to an infinite regress, as
that perfectly practiced critic can be known only if we have already found another
perfectly practiced critic, and so on.
Similar reasons should hold for the perfection corresponding to the condition of
forming comparisons. We can never know if a critic has made all possible or all
necessary comparisons, either because it seems it is always possible to have new
artworks in the same genre in the future, or we cannot determine whether a critic
possesses this perfection unless we have already determined that another critic have
it.
Hume thinks that it is one of the roles of good sense to check the influence of
prejudice, so the question whether a critic is perfectly free from prejudice depends on
the question whether she has perfectly good sense.
The case of good sense is similar to that of delicacy of taste, because both of
them are abilities the superiority of which is judged by the performance, which is in
turn judged by a comparison with an objective standard. The problem is that the
standard is known only through that particular ability in question. Perfectly good
sense is required to know for certain the objective standard, such as the general
62

viewpoint of the intended audience, the relations between the parts of a work, the end
of an artwork, and the reasonings involved. Unless we have perfectly good sense,
and know that our sense is perfectly good, we could not be justified to think that we
have infallible knowledge of the objective standard, and hence could not determine
decisively whether other people have perfectly good sense. However, as the same
reason holds for our own case, we could not be justified to believe that our sense is
perfectly good even if it is. Therefore, both freedom-from-prejudice and good sense
when considered as perfections could not be known.
If these five traits as perfections could not be known, then either true judges
could be known through other marks, or true judges could not be known at all. Hume
does not provide any alternative marks of true judges, so he probably thinks that they
could not be known. This has an apparently devastating consequence for the
argument of Hume’s essay, as the upshot seems to be that no true standard of taste
and beauty can be known. A complete response to this problem will be provided in
the next chapter. The rest of this chapter will try to show that, although we cannot
know the five traits as perfections, we can form comparative ideas of each trait. This
finding will then help us in the next chapter to see what exactly a standard of taste
and beauty is according to Hume.
Although we cannot know whether a person’s taste is perfectly delicate, we can
still compare the judgements of beauty made by different critics, and judge whose
taste is better. In Chapter 9 we have seen how critics discuss such matters. A critic
tries to bring her opponents to see the beauty of an artwork they did not see. She
might fail, so that her opponents would after all still be unable to see that beauty. In
some cases this would happen because that quality is indeed not beautiful; in some
cases it is just because the discussion was not effective. There could be other reasons.
When such an attempt fails, we could not decide whose taste is better. However, if a
critic succeeds in bringing other critics to see the beauty they did not see, this is
evidence that her taste is more delicate, in the sense that she is more sensitive to the
beauties and blemishes of the artwork in question. Moreover, recall that in Chapter 7
we have shown that the aim of judging beauty is to achieve stability and regularity in
matters of beauty. Because of the more comprehensive objective ground now
sensible, the scope of possible variation in the operation of taste would probably be
narrower. Hence, the judgement of beauty afforded is probably more stable and
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regular and thus a better one. Experience of the constant conjunction of more delicate
taste and better judgement of beauty leads us to form a general rule connecting them.
Of course the real situation is probably more complex. For instance, perhaps
there is some other beauty which is not noticed by that critic, but is clearly seen by
her opponents. In such a case, we might not judge conclusively whose taste is more
delicate. Nonetheless, we have a method for making such a decision. Also, we have
pointed out in Chapter 8 that Hume does not aim at providing an account of how
universal agreements are always achievable, so this complexity is not a problem for
him. Notice that in this account, the delicacy of a critic’s taste is shown only after her
opponents have made a better judgement of beauty under her guidance. This agrees
with our observation in Chapter 9 that we do not need to know whose taste is better
in order to be convinced by the better judgement.
It might be worried that it is not so easy to bring other critics to see what they
could not see. Yet Hume is quite optimistic on this point. He thinks that:
Many men, when left to themselves, have but a faint and dubious
perception of beauty, who yet are capable of relishing any fine stroke,
which is pointed out to them. (E-ST, p. 280)
It is much more difficult to see every beauty and blemish of an artwork wholly by
one’s own endeavour than when guidance by other critics is consulted. This
optimism might well be put into question. However, even if we can show that this
optimism is unjustified, this can only show that art criticism is not something easy,
which sounds more like a support for the account proposed above.
It is not clear what it means to say that a critic is more practiced and has formed
more comparisons than another critic. Sometimes we compare in the quantitative
sense, so that we count the times each critic practiced and the number of
comparisons formed. Sometimes a qualitative sense is adopted, so that we judge how
well-practiced a critic is and whether she has made enough comparisons according to
her performance in judging the beauty of an artwork. However, for any just
inter-personal comparison of these two aspects, whether the quantitative or the
qualitative sense is adopted, it has to take into consideration the talent of the critics
being compared. Moreover, it does not seem to be the case that such inter-personal
comparisons are the source of the idea that practice and forming comparison have a
positive effect on our taste. It should be rather that when a person reflects on her own
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self to compare the judgements of beauty she makes before and after she has
practiced and formed comparisons, she would then find that her taste can thus be
improved. Perhaps as a result, she generalises this situation, and forms the idea that,
in general, a better critic is more practiced and has formed more comparisons.
Similarly, when a critic reflects on the viewpoint adopted, and revised her
judgement by removing personal factors from her viewpoint, or adding more details
about the situation of the intended audience to her viewpoint, she would find that her
judgement of beauty becomes more general, so that more people could be convinced
by her judgement. Thus she forms the idea that the more a person is free from
prejudice, the better her judgement is.
The case of good sense is probably similar to that of delicacy of taste. The
previous observation that people can perceive better the beauty of an object when
guided by other people should also hold in this case. When a critic is guided by
another critic, so that the latter’s understanding of an artwork is presented to her, she
might be able to understand that artwork in the same way, and to make a new
judgement of beauty. She could then compare the two understandings and the two
judgements of beauty, and find the defects in her previous understanding and
judgement, which are now revealed and corrected. After several similar experiences,
she would be able to observe that better understanding is generally joined with
sounder judgement.
That we can compare critics in terms of the five aspects above has great
importance, because it means we can form general rules, implicit or explicit, with
regard to the factors which affect the operation of taste. When it is observed
repeatedly that sounder judgements of beauty are produced by critics who perform
better along these five dimensions, reflective general rules on our taste are formed.
With these rules, we know how to improve and correct our taste; and when we have
evidence that our taste is operating under the influence of some defect in these five
aspects, we know that we should not trust our own taste. Also, these general rules are
similar to those general rules of art in the sense that they should be revised if they
conflict with experience, as they are generalisations of experience. Moreover, it can
now be seen how the idea of a better critic is related to the five traits on the basis of
experience. Observations show that the five traits can improve judgements of beauty,
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and as a better critic is one who makes better judgements of beauty, observations
also show that a better critic is a critic whose five traits are better.
Lastly, it should be noted that the comparative ideas of the five traits are not the
marks by which better judges are known. In the survey of these comparative ideas
above, we can see that these advantages are known after we have ourselves made the
judgements made by that critic who has these advantages, and as a result discovered
that their judgements are better. As we have seen in Chapter 9, the superiority of a
judgement of beauty is recognised by an internal comparison between it and another
judgement made by the same critic. Only when we have first come to know whose
judgement is better, and thus also who the better judge is, we would then be able to
compare and evaluate the five traits of critics. Otherwise, we could at most say that
their five traits are different, without any just evaluation possibly to be made. In
other words, the mark of a better judge is her generally better judgements.
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Chapter 11
Standards
It is surprising that Hume’s general idea of what can be counted as a standard is not
discussed in most writings on his ‘Of the Standard of Taste’. Although he does not
discuss it in length, in the Treatise Hume talks about a kind of standard which is
imaginary, just, but useless, and this discussion is indeed very important for our
understanding of ‘Of the Standard of Taste’. It will be shown in the following that
the true standard of taste as the joint verdict of true judges is precisely an instance of
such an imaginary standard.
The term ‘imaginary standard’ is first mentioned in Hume’s attempt to show
that utmost precision and exactness should not be expected in geometry concerning
the three proportions of objects—greater, less and equal. He asserts that ‘the only
useful notion of equality, or inequality, is deriv’d from the whole united appearance
and the comparison of particular objects’ (T 1.2.4.22). These proportions are often
directly determined by the eye or the mind at once. Such decisions might be wrong,
and we correct them in two ways: either by ‘a review or reflection’, or ‘by a
justa-position of the objects; or where that is impracticable, by the use of some
common and invariable measure’ (T 1.2.4.23). Such corrections are constrained by
our instrument or art of measuring, so that we can never be totally free from errors.
We know that there are bodies so minute that they could not be discerned, but
nonetheless we can imagine that the addition or removal of any one of these minute
bodies will render two equal figures unequal. As a result, Hume thinks that, on the
basis of the observed improvement in the fineness of the corrections made, the
natural propensity of the imagination to continue its motion causes us to imagine that
even more and more refined corrections can be made, and thus we also imagine that
the indiscernible inaccuracy in judgements of equality could be corrected. At last, we
‘suppose some imaginary standard of equality, by which the appearances and
measuring are exactly corrected, and the figures reduc’d entirely to that proportion’
(T 1.2.4.24). An example would be the standard of equality in length reduced to the
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equality in the numbers of indivisible points, which are too minute for computation
and hence can only be useless (T 1.2.4.19). Hume continues:
This standard is plainly imaginary. For as the very idea of equality is that
of such a particular appearance corrected by justa-position or a common
measure, the notion of any correction beyond what we have instruments
and art to make, is a mere fiction of the mind, and useless as well as
incomprehensible. (T 1.2.4.24)
It is not difficult to see how the idea of the true standard of taste as the joint
verdict of true judges is also imaginary or fictional in a similar way. As shown in last
chapter, we cannot determine whether a critic is a true judge. This means that the
true standard of taste is useless, because we cannot know what a joint verdict of true
judges is without knowing who they are. This is not to deny the justness of this
standard, as their taste is imagined to be the best possible one, and hence their joint
verdict, if it exists, must be the best one.
We have also seen in Chapter 9 that we can determine which judgement of
beauty is better before the establishment of the comparative status as critic of those
whose judgements are compared. Such decisions might be wrong, as when we try to
make the same judgements as those made by the critics in question, we might fail to
do so because of some external or internal defects, including the defects of our own
taste. Perhaps we are not well-practiced, or have not made enough comparisons, or
are not free from prejudice, etc. Such defects can be discerned in reflection, and be
corrected accordingly. After that, we re-assess the judgements in comparison, and
amend our evaluation of them. Two judgements which seemed to be equally good
previously might then be discovered to be unequal. We can then observe that such
corrections improve the accuracy and justness of our evaluation of judgements of
beauty. However, we can only make such corrections in cases where we can discern
the defects in our evaluation. Our ability to make such discernments constrains our
ability to improve our evaluation both of judgements of beauty and soundness of
taste.
However, it can be observed that our ability to discern the defects could be
improved, so that a more accurate evaluation of judgements of beauty can be made.
Because of the natural propensity of the imagination to continue its motion, this
observation causes us to fancy some imaginary critic, whose judgement only has
68

some as yet indiscernible advantage over the one made by the best judge we can now
distinguish. For the moment, due to our limited ability in evaluating judgements of
beauty, the two judgements appear to be equally good. However, when our ability to
discern the defects in our evaluation of judgements of beauty is improved, that
advantage becomes discernible, so that we can judge that the imaginary critic is the
better one.
The imagination will then lead us to imagine that more and more refined
corrections of our evaluation can be made, and finally, we imagine some true judges
whose five traits are all perfect. Although we do not in fact have the ability to
distinguish them, if they exist, from those who differ from them only indiscernibly,
we still imagine that if we could make such a distinction and we will take their joint
verdict as the true standard of taste and beauty. An imaginary standard is thus
supposed. The joint verdict is the true standard of taste, because it is what the perfect
taste would rule. It is also the true standard of beauty, because it is based on the
sentiment of beauty naturally produced by an artwork when the operation of mental
taste is perfectly sound.
If anyone gives a verdict which does not conform to the true standard, this
implies that her taste is not the best possible one, and the sentiment of beauty she
feels is not the one which would be naturally produced by the artwork if her taste
were the best possible. However, if a verdict conforms to the standard, it is still
possible that the critic who makes this verdict is not a true judge, as the difference
can be too minute to be reflected in language or general ideas. This should be
expected, as it is part of the idea of an imaginary standard that there can be
something which differs from it indiscernibly.
Although this imaginary standard is useless, as our ability is not fine enough to
make the relevant distinctions in order to apply it, this does not prevent Hume from
providing a philosophical analysis of the second species of common sense and
showing that the variety of taste is in fact under control. In Hume’s response to the
possible challenge concerning the difficulty of finding any true judge, he tells us that:
It is sufficient for our present purpose, if we have proved, that the taste of
all individuals is not upon an equal footing, and that some men in general,
however difficult to be particularly pitched upon, will be acknowledged by
universal sentiment to have a preference above others. (E-ST, p. 279)
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We have now come to a position to understand why having proved these two points
is sufficient. The first point, that ‘the taste of all individuals is not upon an equal
footing’, is proved by the observation that the taste of different people deviate from
the sound taste in various degrees and various ways. The second point, that some
men in general are preferred by universal sentiment, is proved by the observed
effects of some character traits, that is, the five traits of true judges, which contribute
to the sound operation of taste, and their preferability, which is implicit in the word
‘sound’, are held by Hume to be ‘acknowledged’ or ‘well known’. 18
Having proved these two points is sufficient for the purpose of providing a
philosophical analysis of the second species of common sense because they show
together that, concerning the soundness of the operation of taste, people have the
ability to judge and correct their own taste. The fact that the tastes of different people
are not equally sound does not entail that people know this inequality; but that some
character traits are in fact preferred because of their contributions to sound taste
implies that people have the ability to judge the soundness of taste, and that they
prefer having a sound taste. As shown in last chapter, the judgement of the soundness
of taste depends on the judgement of the stability and regularity of its product, that is,
the judgement of beauty made by taste. Evaluations of judgements of beauty are
made on the basis of internal comparisons between different judgements of beauty.
Normally the case would be that in which an old judgement is compared to a new
judgement, and the new one is made under the guidance of another critic. Such
guidance can take different forms, such as pointing out the influence of a certain
quality previously omitted, asking for more practice or more comparisons, detecting
the unnoticed personal prejudice, providing a better understanding of an artwork, etc.
In virtue of such guidance, a person’s taste is corrected and improved, so that a new
and better judgement of beauty can be made and then be compared with the old one.
Therefore, the ability of judging taste depends on the ability to correct one’s own
taste. From the different kind of corrections arises a useless imaginary standard, as

18

In fact, Hume does not provide any direct evidence for his view that the five traits are preferable.
He tells us that ‘every one pretends to’ have the delicacy of taste (E-ST, p. 272); ‘a delicate taste of
wit or beauty must always be a desirable quality’ (E-ST, p. 274); and ‘[i]t is well known ... [that]
prejudice ... is no less contrary to good taste; nor has it less influence to corrupt our sentiment of
beauty’ (E-ST, p. 277). The other three traits are then claimed to be advantageous to the delicacy of
taste or the freedom-from-prejudice. Perhaps Hume is taking the preferability of these traits as an
obvious fact.
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the imagination keeps on imagining further corrections, even beyond our ability to
discriminate the difference.
The examples used when Hume mentions the second species of common sense
can be analysed in this way. When someone prefers Ogilby over Milton, or Bunyan
over Addison, it can be found that this preference is a result of the defects in the
operation of her taste. That there is a general agreement in rejecting her sentiment as
absurd and ridiculous suggests that people have the ability to judge the taste of
different people. This suggestion can be accepted, because the fact that the character
of true judge is universally preferred presupposes that people have an idea of such a
character, and this in turn presupposes their ability to judge the soundness of taste.
That people can judge the soundness of taste and that they have a preference for
the character of true judge shows that there is a natural mechanism in human nature
which allows and causes people to converge on better judgements of beauty.
Therefore the variety of taste is actually constrained by this mechanism, which also
explains the lack of radical shifts in taste in history.
If the true standard of taste is an imaginary standard which is also useless, then
we are left with a question: is there any actual standard of taste? One might think that
the general rules formed on the observations that judgements of beauty can be
improved by the five traits might serve as standards of taste. However, this cannot be
the case. Towards the end of last chapter we have seen why the comparative ideas of
the five traits are not marks by which better judges are known. We can make
inter-personal comparative judgement of these five traits only after we have already
judged the taste of different critics. This judgement concerning their taste is made on
the comparison of the judgements of beauty they make. In any particular discussion
between critics, the one who makes the best judgement among them has the best
taste, and her verdict would be counted as the standard. Of course her verdict is
fallible, but this does not mean that it cannot serve as a standard. After Hume has
illustrated his view on geometrical equality of objects, he applies the same analysis
to the case of right lines. He writes, ‘The original standard of a right line is in reality
nothing but a certain general appearance’ (T 1.2.4.30). Such a general appearance is
fallible, but could be corrected and refined by measurement or juxtaposition, though
it could never become certain. That an uncertain and fallible general appearance is
referred to as a ‘standard’ by Hume shows that he does not think that a standard
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should be infallible. This suggests that we should distinguish a standard of taste from
the true standard of taste, and that the latter is useless does not imply the former is
also useless. While the true but useless standard of taste is the unknowable joint
verdict of true judges, an actual but fallible standard of taste is the verdict of the
critic who proves to have the best taste in a discussion.
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Chapter 12
Viewpoint and Sympathy
Among the five traits of true judges, one of them requires special attention. A true
judge should be free from prejudice. This requirement might be referred to as the
freedom-from-prejudice requirement. When a true judge judges the beauty of an
artwork, she should forget herself, and adopt the general viewpoint of the intended
audience, or simply the intended viewpoint. Hume thinks that, in order to produce
the desired effects, an orator must have her intended audience in mind, as their
particular features determine how they would respond (E-ST, p. 276). Without due
argument, Hume simply extends the case of oration to other art forms. Perhaps he
thinks that in the case of other art forms, the artist, in creating an artwork, also has an
intention to produce a certain response in a particular audience. As a result, the
artist’s idea of her intended audience shapes her artwork, and the proper
understanding of it would have to acknowledge this fact.
Peter Kivy (2011) questions the consistency of a relevant passage in Hume’s
essay:
A critic of a different age or nation ... must place himself in the same
situation as the audience, in order to form a true judgment of the oration. In
like manner, when any work is addressed to the public, though I should
have a friendship or enmity with the author, I must depart from this
situation; and considering myself as a man in general, forget, if possible,
my individual being and my peculiar circumstances. (E-ST, p. 276)
He thinks that the first part of this passage corresponds to what he calls ‘the method
of Historicism’, 19 but the second part, in contrast, corresponds to what C. S. Lewis
calls ‘the method of The Unchanging Human Heart’ (Kivy 2011, p. 112-113). If
Kivy is right, then the freedom-from-prejudice requirement is inconsistent, as it is
impossible for a critic to place herself in a particular situation and at the same time
holds on to nothing more than the unchanging human heart.

19

This label does not fully capture Hume’s idea, as he does not focus only on artworks from a
different age, but also those from a different nation.
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The problem of Kivy’s reading is that he misunderstands the second part of the
passage. When Hume uses the term ‘a man in general’, the contrast in his mind is
that between features that are tied to that particular person and those that are not.
When an author addresses her work to the public, she does not put into it features
that are accessible only to some particular individuals among her intended audience.
Rather, the relevant features should be accessible for everyone sharing that point of
view. When I read the work, if I have my response because of my being the
particular person I am, then this response is not relevant to the work. Therefore, what
Hume is saying is not that I should forget any peculiarities, but just ‘my individual
being’ and ‘my peculiar circumstances’. What remains would be something that can
be shared by other people, and that is what it means to consider myself as ‘a man in
general’.
Understood in this way, the alleged inconsistency is resolved. When I adopt the
intended viewpoint, the relevant features of it, however peculiar they are, are not my
peculiarities, and can be general to everyone who adopts it.
The kind of freedom here is a condition in which a person is not tied to any
particular viewpoint, but is able to switch easily from one viewpoint to another,
depending on what the artwork requires. Also, a true judge is not required to forget
herself entirely. All that is required is that her judgement be made from the intended
viewpoint. She can at the same time be fully aware of how the artwork appears to her
from her own personal viewpoint.
This requirement apparently makes Hume’s view a version of relativism, as the
beauty of an artwork is relative to a particular viewpoint. An artwork is not beautiful
simpliciter, but beautiful for the intended audience. This looks very like the relativist
analysis of the structure of judgements of beauty: ‘An object O is beautiful for a
certain group of people P’. This might make it perplexing why a particular
viewpoint—that of the intended audience—should be privileged over the others. It
should be possible for critics to agree on the judgement that an artwork is beautiful
for its intended audience, while at the same time judge that it is ugly for some other
group of people. Insofar as there is an agreement over the former judgement, there
seems to be no reason to reject the latter one, as well as many other judgements made
from other viewpoints. Perhaps a critic might even be justified to make the former
judgement on the basis of authentic reports from the intended audience, without
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herself adopting their viewpoint. Why does Hume make such a strong claim that
when the intended viewpoint is not adopted, a critic’s sentiments ‘are perverted’
(E-ST, p. 277)?
Hume does not address this problem in ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, but a
possible answer could be constructed out of what we have discussed so far. Earlier in
Chapter 7, it has been mentioned that the word ‘beauty’ is a term in general language,
which refers to a certain quality which is generally accessible. This means a critic
must be able to perceive the beauty in making a judgement of beauty. Judgements of
beauty made wholly on the basis of testimony, without the critic being able to
perceive the beauty, are thus ruled out. Given this requirement of general
accessibility, to say that beauty is relative to a certain viewpoint implies that the
viewpoint should be generally adoptable. One possible candidate of such a viewpoint
is one which consists of elements common to the whole species, which corresponds
to the method of The Unchanging Human Heart. The problem of such a viewpoint is
that, when it is adopted, we do not have enough resources to understand some
qualities in an artwork embedded in a certain cultural background.
This problem prompts us to consider another option, that is, the viewpoint of the
intended audience, which corresponds to the method of Historicism. This seems to be
a better option, as the cultural content of an artwork, if intelligible, should be
accessible to the intended audience. Or perhaps we may say that an artwork is
intended to be understandable for its intended audience. However, there might seem
to be another problem, that is, it is not obvious how it can be a general viewpoint.
The sense in which such a viewpoint is general here is not that it is thin in details, but
that, as we have shown above, it does not involve features peculiar to some particular
individual(s), and hence is generally adoptable for the common people. The adoption
of it would not require some knowledge of the intended audience that is not publicly
communicable, so that any critic with a fair level of intelligence could form an idea
of it.
From these considerations, we can see that only the viewpoint of the intended
audience could fit with the nature of the word ‘beauty’ as a general term. 20
20

It might be objected that perhaps there are other candidate viewpoints we haven’t considered.
Perhaps someone can just adopt a viewpoint that is consistent with the intended viewpoint. This
cannot be right, as some completely irrelevant viewpoint could be consistent with the intended one.
Another suggestion would be that someone can adopt a viewpoint which completely coincides with
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Therefore, when a critic does not adopt this viewpoint when she judges the beauty of
an artwork, she is not following the linguistic convention of the usage of the word
‘beauty’, so that her judgement should be rejected.
Here we can see that Hume’s view is quite different from relativism. For a
relativist, the different viewpoints adopted by different people are on a par; but for
Hume, there is one and only one viewpoint that is proper to the judgement of beauty.
If we consider these two views further, we can also find that the relation between the
viewpoint and the critic is not the same in these views. The relativist associates the
viewpoint to the critic, so that which viewpoint is adopted depends on who the critic
is. In contrast, for Hume, the viewpoint is instead associated with the artwork, so that
it is the artwork, as created in a particular historical situation by an artist acting on
certain intentions, which determines which viewpoint should be adopted. Perhaps we
might say that an artwork has an intrinsic requirement concerning which viewpoint
should be adopted in judging its beauty. It should be clear now that Hume’s view is
not a version of relativism.
There is another problem concerning the freedom-from-prejudice requirement,
which is related to the later discussion in ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ of the two
blameless sources of variation. There seems to be some tension between these two
parts of Hume’s essay. The freedom-from-prejudice requirement seems to have
eliminated the idiosyncrasies among different true judges by demanding them to
adopt the intended viewpoint; on the other hand, the allowance of two blameless
sources of variation just brings back the individual differences. How could this
tension be resolved?
that of the intended audience in aspects relevant to the appreciation of the artwork, but nonetheless
they are different in the irrelevant aspects. It seems these two viewpoints are in effect equivalent, but
if Hume really thinks that artworks are shaped by the artist’s idea of her intended audience, we should
still not accept this proposal. On the one hand, if a critic knows that the viewpoint she adopts
completely coincides in the relevant aspects with that of the intended audience, she has no reason to
prefer the former over the latter. On the other hand, if the viewpoint she adopts just happens to
coincide with the intended one, then it seems she would not be able to justify her decision. We should
bear in mind that Hume is focusing on art criticism here. When a critic is choosing among different
possible viewpoints, in so far as art criticism is considered as an activity which concerns whether an
artwork is truly beautiful, she should choose the viewpoint which she is justified to believe that it
shows her the artwork’s true beauty. If the two viewpoints coincide just by chance, then it seems she
can justify her decision only if she knows that they are in effect equivalent in the relevant aspects, but
that is possible only if she has already perceived the true beauty of that artwork from the intended
viewpoint. This means that, again, she has no reason to prefer her viewpoint over the intended one.
How about reasons which appeal to the difference between the two viewpoints in aspect irrelevant to
art criticism? Since Hume is focusing on art criticism in his essay, he does not need to respond to this
question.
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Given the assumption of a common human nature, everyone having the same
sound taste, adopting the same viewpoint, and being in the same external
circumstances should be pleased, or displeased, by the same artwork. The same
artwork can be beautiful and deformed at the same time if critics adopt different
viewpoints. It is the role of the freedom-from-prejudice requirement to prevent
variations caused by differences in the viewpoints adopted. However, as shown in
Chapter 7, adopting the same viewpoint does not prevent variations in the degree of
force or vivacity of the pleasure or pain felt. The two blameless sources of variation
comprise factors which affect the natural relations between the idea of the critic
herself and that of the intended audience. Indeed, different critics inevitably stand in
different relations with the intended audience. It is easier for us to sympathize with
those whose humour resembles ours, and also those whose culture is similar,
contiguous, or causally connected to our own culture. This leads to an inevitable
variation in the degree of force or vivacity to be communicated through sympathy,
and thus the idea of pleasure or pain is enlivened to different degrees for each critic.
The variation of the degree of force or vivacity of the pleasure or pain implies a
corresponding variation in the degree of our approbation or blame, as Hume holds
that ‘[t]he very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration. ... Our approbation is
imply’d in the immediate pleasure they convey to us’ (T 3.1.2.3). However, insofar
as the same viewpoint is adopted, pleasure would not become pain, and hence beauty
would not become deformity, and vice versa. Therefore, the two sources of variation
‘are not sufficient indeed to confound all the boundaries of beauty and deformity, but
will often serve to produce a difference in the degrees of our approbation or blame’
(ST, p. 280).
For ‘a man of learning and reflection’, he is well aware of the influence of these
two sources of variation, and hence ‘can make allowance for these peculiarities of
manners’ (E-ST, p. 282). A true judge is surely also such a man of learning and
reflection for Hume. What is the kind of allowance made by such a critic? Hume
does not deny that it can be a correction of the sentiment, but given the involuntary
nature of the sentiment, this is extremely difficult. Nonetheless, such a man of
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learning can at least make a correction of the language employed in pronouncing his
judgement. 21
We can now see that the apparent tension between the freedom-from-prejudice
requirement and the two blameless sources of variation can be resolved easily. Once
we know that the freedom-from-prejudice requirement concerns the way we obtain
the pleasure or pain proper for the judgement of beauty and deformity, and that the
two blameless sources of variation concern the actual degree of force or vivacity of
that pleasure or pain, we realise that they concern different though related issues, so
there is indeed no tension between them.
Lastly, with our better understanding of Hume’s discussion on the two sources
of blameless variation, we can see how exactly this consideration is connected to the
previous parts of his essay. Having provided a philosophical analysis of the second
species of common sense, Hume has in fact just shown that the variety of taste
described in the beginning of the essay can be reduced, because the taste of people
converge in virtue of improving their ability to make judgements of beauty. However,
a sameness in the judgement of beauty they make does not imply sameness in the
sentiment they have. Even when all defects are eliminated, and everyone becomes a
true judge, particular judges still inevitably stand in different relations to the intended
audience, and as a result their sentiments inevitable vary in degree of force and
vivacity. However, since allowance can be made to offset such variations in
formulating judgements of beauty, we neither need to nor could remove them. In
short, the variety of taste is controlled, but can never be eliminated.

21

Perhaps the ability to correct the language used in formulating one’s own judgement of beauty is
also one of the reasons why good sense is required for true judges. If this is also what Hume would
agree, we might wonder why he does not mention this contribution of good sense in his discussion of
it. A possible reason is that the focus there is on how a critic could feel the proper sentiment, but not
how to express the judgement made on the basis of the sentiment felt.
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Chapter 13
Moral Prejudice
In Hume’s discussion of the external blameless sources of variation, he holds that if
the artwork incorporates moral principles that are different from ours, or in order
words, if the artwork involves some moral prejudice, it is both impossible and
improper for us to enter into that sentiment which allows us to relish it (E-ST, p. 282).
Hereafter these two claims will be referred to as the psychological impossibility 22
claim and the normative claim respectively. Hume does not provide a detailed
explanation for these two claims. At most we are told that ‘a very violent effort’ is
needed to alter a person’s own moral principles, and that a person is ‘justly jealous of’
her own moral principles the rectitude of which she is confident of (E-ST, p. 283).
However, this only puts the same claims in another way.
Worse still, apart from lacking sufficient explanation, the two claims above
appear to contradict the freedom-from-prejudice requirement. Following Hume, we
might take a poem as an example. Assume that in this poem, judging from our moral
principles, ‘vicious manners are described, without being marked with the proper
characters of blame and disapprobation’ (E-ST, p. 282). Since the purpose of poetry
is ‘to please by means of the passions and the imagination’ (E-ST, p. 277), we can
say that the intended audience of this poem are those who will be pleased by it by
means of the passions and the imagination. However, we are morally displeased to
find that vicious characters or manners are not properly blamed or punished.
Therefore, we are not the intended audience. Note that it is not the description of the
vicious characters or manners taken in itself that causes the problem; rather, it is the
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By ‘impossibility’ I do not mean a strict impossibility, in which case I would have contradicted
Hume’s allowance that one could nonetheless alter one’s moral principles and enter into that alien
sentiment if ‘a very violent effort’ is made. The kind of impossibilities in my mind can be illustrated
in this way: imagine that an ordinary person is asked to use her foot to hold a pen and draw as well as
she could as using her hand. In ordinary discourse, we would happily allow people to say without
qualification that it is impossible, while at the same time be fully aware that in certain extreme cases,
such as if her arms were amputated, she might make ‘a very violent effort’ and turn such an
‘impossibility’ into a possibility. If this example does not work, consider some extremely difficult
yoga poses or skills in artistic gymnastics. Although it seems in some of such cases, even a very
violent effort might still not be enough to change the impossibilities into possibilities. In short, the
kind of impossibilities here is relative to an ordinary human being under ordinary circumstances.
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absence of proper blame and punishment that makes the poem displeasing. The
freedom-from-prejudice requirement demands us to adopt the viewpoint of the
intended audience in judging the beauty of this poem. That means we should enter
into the sentiment of the intended audience, and be pleased by the poem in which
vicious characters or manners are not properly punished; but this is claimed to be
impossible and improper later on in Hume’s essay.
This problem is formulated by Michelle Mason (2001) as what she calls ‘the
moral prejudice dilemma’ (p. 60b). 23 As a result of these contradictory claims,
Mason thinks that a critic should either overlook her own moral principles in judging
the poem, or insist on her moral principles and hence fail to be a true judge. This
formulation is not quite right, as the first horn of it ignores Hume’s psychological
impossibility claim. Therefore, the consequence might be better put in this way: our
inability to alter our moral principles means that it is impossible in such cases for us
to be free from prejudice in judging the beauty of the artwork, and this failure is
morally proper. This consequence does not seem to be attractive. In order to evaluate
Hume’s position, this chapter will start with an attempt to accurately understand why
exactly Hume makes the psychological impossibility claim and the normative claim.
This understanding will then allow us to see what consequences can be attributed to
his position, and to evaluate it accordingly.
Hume’s two claims concerning cases of moral prejudice should be considered
separately, and we shall start with the normative claim. For Hume, what it means to
say that something is improper for us to do can be understood by looking at his idea
of obligation, as it can be viewed as saying that we have an obligation not to perform
it:
All morality depends upon our sentiments; and when any action, or quality
of the mind, pleases us after a certain manner, we say it is virtuous; and
when the neglect, or non-performance of it, displeases us after a like
manner, we say that we lie under an obligation to perform it. (T 3.2.5.4)
Accordingly, if something is improper for us to do, that just means that the
performance of it displeases us after a certain manner. Where there is any moral
prejudice, the absence of proper blame and punishment for vicious characters or
23

Works cited from The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, as well as other publications which
have two columns on one page, will be cited with page numbers followed by an English letter ‘a’ or
‘b’, which stands for the left column and the right column respectively.
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manners is a sign that ‘the limits of vice and virtue’ are confounded, and this
displeases us (E-ST, p. 283). This means we lie under an obligation to avoid
confounding the limits of vice and virtue. It we failed to meet this obligation, this
shows that our own character is morally defective. If we were to adopt the viewpoint
of the intended audience and enter into the sentiment of them, we would then not be
displeased by the confounded limits of vice and virtue. Such an idea of ourselves is
displeasing, so we have the obligation not to enter into the sentiment of the intended
audience, that is, it is improper for us to do so.
The reasoning behind the psychological impossibility claim is much more
difficult to understand. In Chapter 7 we have seen that to adopt the viewpoint of the
intended audience is to sympathise with them. This involves the formation of an idea
of their pleasure, and by the communication of force and vivacity from a critic’s idea
of her own self to her idea of the intended audience, and finally to the idea of their
pleasure, this idea of pleasure is enlivened to be that very pleasure. Therefore, if it is
impossible for us to adopt the viewpoint of the intended audience in the case of
moral prejudice, there is probably something going wrong in this process.
We might separate the process of sympathy into two parts: the first is the
formation of the idea of the pleasure of the intended audience, and the second part is
the communication of the force and vivacity among ideas. At first glance, both parts
in the case of moral prejudice seem to be as normal as in the innocent case. We
should have no difficulty in forming an idea of the pleasure of the intended audience.
That we find it improper to enter into their sentiments presupposes our knowledge of
their pleasure. On the other hand, the natural relations between the idea of our own
selves and our idea of the intended audience should not be so weak as to be
completely inoperative. After all, all human beings resemble each other more than
other species of animals, but it is arguably true that we can also sympathise with
animals. Merely holding different moral principles should not be a difference so
destructive to the operation of sympathy. A more careful diagnosis is required to
unveil the problem.
We should start with an investigation of the idea of the pleasure of the intended
audience. How is it formed? Does the existence of moral prejudice affect the
formation of it? It has been shown in Chapter 7 how an idea of the pleasure of the
intended audience is formed in an innocent case. It should be helpful for us to see
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how the account presented there might apply to a poem in which vicious character or
manners receive proper blame or punishment first. Imagine a poem, intended to be
recited to Tibetans, which describes sky burial, the most widely practiced form of
burial in Tibet. It is believed that, according to the teaching of Tibetan Buddhism,
after a person dies, to have his own body to be eaten by hungry predatory birds is the
last generous and virtuous thing he could ‘do’ in this world. In this poem, a young
Tibetan man goes to the sky burial site right before the rogyapas (body-breakers)
disassemble the body of his deceased father who is a pious Buddhist. This is
forbidden by the rule that relatives of the deceased person are not allowed to enter
the site. This young man wants to stop the ceremony and get back his father’s body,
but fails to do so. After that, he is severely punished by lamas.
When we read this poem, we might at first be displeased by this kind of burial,
because it is too different from the kinds of burial practiced in our own culture, and
even conflicts with our attitude towards the bodies of deceased people. However,
after a study of the cultural background of this practice, we come to understand the
religious and moral meaning of it. With such factual knowledge, we know that it is
sacred and virtuous for Tibetans. As the young man in the poem attempts to stop the
sky burial of his father, we can now understand his action as an attempt to stop
something sacred and virtuous from happening. Given this understanding, we have
an idea of how the intended audience sees what the young Tibetan man does. All
these are matters of fact, which are objects of reason.
Next, we can move on to matters of sentiment. In our own culture, preventing
something virtuous from being done is a vice which displeases us. A general rule is
formed on the observation that such behaviour is generally followed by a feeling of
pain, so that whenever an idea of such behaviour is present in our mind, the
imagination moves naturally from this idea to an idea of pain. The two ideas are
connected by the natural relation of cause and effect. When we have an idea of the
intended audience in mind, together with the relevant knowledge of their culture, we
imagine and come to have an idea of their view of the action described in the poem.
Then, our imagination naturally moves from this latter idea to an idea of their pain,
in virtue of the relation of cause and effect between them. The reason why the
general rule involved here is one of our own general rules but not one of the intended
audience’s is that it does not make sense to say that our own mind is affected by
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some other people’s general rules. No matter what general rules the intended
audience holds, it is impossible for our imagination to blindly and unreflectively
move from one idea to another idea according to general rules in their mind. In virtue
of the same mechanism, the proper punishment received by the young Tibetan man
produces in our mind an idea of the pleasure of the intended audience.
A comment should be added here concerning the general rule. I propose that
such a general rule is what Hume calls a ‘moral principle’ in his discussion on the
case of moral prejudice. A moral principle should be considered as a particular
manifestation of original principles of human nature. 24 It cannot be an original
principle itself, as Hume’s assumption of the common human nature would then
deny the possibility of there being different moral principles among different cultures.
Moreover, as general rules are something which connect ideas, they are different
from original principles of human nature, which determine what sentiment
(impression) will be caused by what happens in our mind. Since the moral principles
involved in Hume’s discussion of moral prejudice can determine whether a critic can
form an idea of pleasure or pain from an idea of the characters or manners described
in an artwork, it should be a general rule, rather than an original principle.
On the other hand, a moral principle must not be overly specific. For example,
if there is a general rule which connects an idea of pain with a highly specific idea of
somebody who goes into the site of sky burial and stops the ceremony, then it cannot
be possessed by anybody who lives in a culture which does not have the practice of
sky burial, as repeated experiences of sky burial would not be available for the
formation of custom in the imagination. Without that general rule, when such a
person reads the poem in the above example, her imagination cannot move from the
former idea to the latter. This just means that even if she has all the relevant factual
knowledge, her imagination still cannot naturally move from her idea of the action to
any idea of pain. It does not mean that she cannot arbitrarily relate these two ideas
together. However, the relation of ideas here in this case would be just a
philosophical relation; or more precisely, it is just another piece of fact. In the
absence of a natural relation, the communication of force and vivacity between ideas
24

Since these original principles are not something we can directly know, we can only form on the
basis of experience some general rules which trace their particular manifestations. These general rules
are not always explicitly formulated, as the common people might only have their imagination be
influenced by them, but do not know explicitly what they are. Only those more reflective people, such
as philosophers, would have some of their general rules explicitly formulated.
83

that is requisite for sympathy is no longer possible. The force and vivacity of my idea
of my own self can be communicated to my idea of the intended audience; but this
latter idea cannot communicate its force and vivacity to any idea of pain related to it
just by philosophical relation. As a result, even in a case where there is no conflict
between moral principles, the critic also cannot enter into the sentiment of the
intended audience. This should not be allowed by Hume, so what he calls ‘moral
principle’ should not be too specific. A general rule which connects an idea of the
prevention of virtuous action with an idea of pain would be general enough to count
as a moral principle.
We can now move on to a case which involves moral prejudice. We can
imagine another poem, in which almost all the same events are described, except that
the young Tibetan man is not properly punished. This case is much more
complicated. First of all, who would be the intended audience? There seems to be
two candidate groups of the intended audience. On the one hand, as the end of poetry
is ‘to please by means of the passions and the imagination’, the intended audience
seem to be those who would be pleased by this poem. On the other hand, when we
try to adopt the viewpoint of the intended audience, that is, when we imagine how
they would react to the poem, we can only have an idea of an intended audience
which is naturally connected to an idea of pain. Here is the reason. Given all the
relevant knowledge, we know that the action of the young Tibetan man is an attempt
to prevent something virtuous from happening. This must be agreed by the intended
audience. As we are trying to formulate a case of moral prejudice, this requires that
the different moral principles should concern the same action understood in the same
way, but differ only in whether pain or pleasure follows. According to our own
relevant general rule, which has been shown above to be the only possible one which
can affect the operation of our own mind, the above idea of the action of the young
Tibetan man is only naturally connected to an idea of pain. Therefore, when we
imagine the sentiment of the intended audience by considering how they would
understand the poem, only an idea of pain could be formed and naturally connected
to our idea of them.
This is not to deny that an idea of pleasure might be arbitrarily related to our
idea of the intended audience; but the relation in this case would then be a
philosophical relation, which is either a matter of fact, or a relation of ideas. Perhaps
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we might have a chance to directly observe the reaction of some group of Tibetans,
who are the intended Tibetan audience and thus are actually pleased by the poem, so
that the philosophical relation is a matter of fact; or we might reason from the
assumption that the end of poetry is to please to the conclusion that the intended
audience should be pleased by the poem, so that the philosophical relation is a
relation of ideas.
In brief, in this case of moral prejudice, our idea of the intended audience is
related to an idea of pleasure through a philosophical relation, and to an idea of pain
through a natural relation. Since the process of sympathy requires the ideas involved
to be connected by natural relations, as the communication of force and vivacity
depends on natural relations but not philosophical relations, we can now see why
Hume thinks that it is impossible for us to enter into the sentiment of the intended
audience in cases involving moral prejudice. The problem is not located at the
connection between the idea of our own self and the idea of the intended audience;
rather, it is located at the connection between the idea of the intended audience and
the idea of pleasure. This latter connection is a philosophical relation, and that means
no matter how much force and vivacity is added to the idea of the intended audience,
the force and vivacity cannot be further communicated to the idea of pleasure, and
hence it cannot be strengthened to become that very pleasure itself. In contrast, as the
idea of the intended audience is naturally related to the idea of pain, the process of
sympathy is not obstructed, and therefore the idea of pain can become the very pain
itself. This means that when we sympathise with the intended audience, that is, when
we try to adopt their viewpoint, although we might know that they are pleased by the
poem, the only sentiment we can feel is pain, not pleasure. It is thus impossible for
us to enter into the sentiment of the intended audience.
Now we have explained both the psychological impossibility claim and the
normative claim. We can then proceed to see what consequence these two claims
have. Hume thinks that when we read a poem like the one in the second example
above, we can only find the poem deformed (E-ST, p. 282). This is because our
judgement of beauty is made on the basis of the sentiment felt, and since we can only
feel pain, we judge it to be deformed. However, one might ask, why does not Hume
allow in this case that we might make allowance for the difference in sentiment felt
which is caused by external factors? An educated person might be able to recognise
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the influence of the difference in moral principles, and it seems quite possible for her
to correct her language or sentiment in making the judgement of beauty. What is the
reason for Hume’s denial of this possibility?
Here is a simple reply. In last chapter, it has been pointed out that the allowance
that is provided by the correction of language or sentiment concerns the variations in
the degree of the fore and vivacity of the sentiment felt. Such variations are the
effects of the influence of the internal frame of the mind and the external situation
caused on the operation of sympathy. As sympathy is just a mechanism of the mind
by which an idea is enlivened to become a passion, it cannot change pleasure into
pain, or pain into pleasure. Therefore, in the case of the poem in question, where the
moral prejudice causes us to feel pain while the intended audience should feel
pleasure, the kind of allowance mentioned in the discussion of blameless variations
is not applicable.
This reply is not fully satisfactory, as it can be further questioned why Hume
does not allow any correction of language or sentiment which could deal with such
cases. Apart from his more fundamental thought that a judgement of beauty should
be based on the sentiment genuinely felt, there seems to be no strong reason to deny
that a critic can judge something to be beautiful when he is aware of the fact that he
is under the influence of moral prejudice and is thus actually feeling pain. Perhaps
one of Hume’s worries is that when the actual sentiment felt does not correspond to
that of the intended audience, the critic could have no reference point to rank the
artwork within the particular genre to which it belongs. Her pain tells her nothing
about how strong the pleasure of the intended audience would be relative to the
pleasure occasioned by other works in the same genre. We might grant that this is a
practical problem, but it is not enough to support the conclusion that such a
correction is in principle impossible. It might be very difficult to achieve a precise
ranking under the influence of moral prejudice, but given that it is also extremely
difficult to be a true judge, merely being difficult could not be counted as a decisive
reason in support of Hume’s position. It might be argued that indeed Hume is also
aware of this weakness of his view, and that is why he seems to allow that our
sentiment could be changed through some very violent effort (E-ST, p. 283). We
have no way to rescue Hume’s view from this question, so we will leave it as such.
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Chapter 14
Controversies
Hume’s essay ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ has raised many interpretative problems
and has been the object of many discussions in contemporary aesthetics. In this
chapter, a few of them will be responded to on the basis of the interpretation we have
developed in previous chapters.

A. Levinson’s ‘Real Problem’
In Levinson (2006), the author presents a ‘real problem’ which he considers as one
likely to be raised by a modern reader of Hume’s ‘Of the Standard of Taste’.
Levinson admits that his paper ‘is not primarily an exercise in historical scholarship
(p. 367),’ i.e. he does not claim that this problem is a problem for Hume, but he just
wants to show that a solution to it could be found in Hume’s essay. In our discussion
below, it will be shown that both Levinson’s problem and solution are based upon
his misunderstanding of Hume’s essay, and if we re-formulate his problem according
to our interpretation, we can see that it should not be in any sense a problem for
Hume.
Levinson’s ‘real problem’ could be briefly summarised as follows: given that I
am not an ideal judge, the artworks I enjoy and prefer are not the same as those
enjoyed and preferred by ideal judges. I simply cannot share their enjoyment because
of the difference in our taste. For me, those artworks approved by ideal judges are
less enjoyable than those which I like. Why should I care what an ideal judge likes?
Why should the joint verdict offered by ideal judges have any bearing on my taste, so
that I should like what I do not like, or try to become more like an ideal judge?
A problem immediately arises: Levinson seems to be assuming that, for Hume,
art criticism is at least mainly an activity which helps us maximise our enjoyment in
art. It suggests that if it can be shown that following the joint verdict of true judges
could maximise our enjoyment in art, then it justifies the view that we should care
about their joint verdict. Although it can be agreed that true judges can determine
which artworks can provide the highest enjoyment human beings are capable of
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having, as suggested in Hume’s discussion of delicacy of taste (E-ST, p. 274), it does
not follow that enjoyment maximisation is the aim of art criticism, nor does it follow
that true judges necessarily enjoy only those artworks judged by them to be the best.
Chapter 9 has shown that art criticism is an activity which answers to the demand of
making judgements of beauty, when ‘beauty’ is taken as a term in general language.
Its aim is to correctly judge the beauty of artworks, which is understood as the power
of some qualities in artworks which naturally pleases when a critic is in a sound state
of internal organs (and under the appropriate external circumstances). However, later
in Chapter 12, the role and effect of sympathy were identified. We know that if the
natural relations between the critic’s idea of the intended audience and her idea of
herself are weak, she is not able to feel much pleasure from considering an artwork,
even if she judges it to be good. Therefore, Hume’s view allows that, depending on
the qualities of the intended audience, a true judge might enjoy more a lesser artwork
than a better one. Insofar as the correction of language is appropriately made, a
critic’s preference and enjoyment are independent of her judgement of beauty.
Therefore, for Hume, art criticism should not be conceived as an activity which aims
at the maximisation of enjoyment, as this is irrelevant to its aim of correctly judging
the beauty of artwork.
Also, the claim that the best artworks can provide the highest enjoyment human
beings are capable of having should not be understood as implying that all true
judges are equally pleased by such artworks. At most, the highest enjoyment an
artwork could afford is only accessible to those true judges in the intended audience,
or those who can fully correct their sentiment beyond merely correcting their
language, so that they are pleased to the same extent as a true judge among the intend
audience. However, this is not part of the requirement for a critic to be a true judge.
In other words, being a true judge does not make a person always capable of having
the highest enjoyment affordable by every artwork. This shows that, if it should be
justified that the joint verdict of true judges should be listened to, Hume would never
think that the justification comes from the prospect of highest enjoyment.
As for Levinson’s solution to the ‘real problem’, in addition to the same
problematic assumption discussed above, it also involves another problem. His
solution relies heavily on the idea that a true judge is ‘a reliable indicator or identifier
of artistic value, that is, intrinsically-worthwhile-experience-affording capacity—in
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its varying degrees’ (Levinson 2006, p. 380). Levinson thinks that we need to test
critics by checking whether they can fully appreciate the masterworks, and after their
status as true judge has been established, we have a reason to attend to their joint
verdict, as they are ‘our best barometers of the artistic value of works of art generally’
(ibid, p. 381). This means that our reason to attend to the joint verdict of true judges
depends on the prior establishment of their status as true judge. However, even if we
set aside the impossibility of establishing who the true judges are, and weaken
Levinson’s view to the extent that we have a reason to attend to the verdict of judges
who are merely better than us in virtue of their superior but less than ideal taste, we
should still not accept Levinson’s view. According to the account provided in
Chapter 9, we need not establish the superiority of a critic’s taste before our
assessment of her judgement; rather, our approbation of her taste is implied by our
acceptance of her judgement. We ‘internalise’ her judgement, in the sense of coming
to see an artwork in the same way as the critic sees it, and thus share her sentiment.
We can then compare her judgement and our own one, so that we could determine
whose judgement is better. If the critic’s judgement is better than ours, we accept that
her taste performs better in this case. When we observe that the same critic usually
makes better judgement of beauty, then we believe that the ability to make better
judgement of beauty is part of her character, and admit that she is a better judge.
Levinson’s worry should not be dismissed simply because of these
misunderstandings. We should try to re-formulate it according to our interpretation to
see if it could be revived. Levinson thinks that his ‘real problem’ is a question which
‘most naturally arises in the mind of an ordinary, skeptical art-lover in regard to
Hume’s solution to the problem of taste’ (ibid, p. 372). Perhaps the criticism
presented above has misidentified the domain of the ‘real problem’—it is not a
problem for art critics, but a problem for art-lovers. However, it will then make the
‘real problem’ irrelevant to Hume’s essay, as ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ is a work
which focuses on art criticism. It is directed to critics, that is, those who care about
the true beauty of artworks. It should be reminded that, as presented in Chapter 8, the
possibility of there being a standard of taste is secured by a consideration on
examples drawn from art criticism, which concern the comparative merit of Ogilby
and Milton, Bunyan and Addison (E-ST, p. 269). Thereafter, Hume does not extend
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his consideration beyond the realm of art criticism, and hence any interpretation
which makes such an extension is not a fair interpretation of Hume’s view.
From Levinson’s formulation of the ‘real problem’, although no clear
characterisation of art-lovers is provided, we can still see that they are the kind of
people whose interest lies on the maximisation of enjoyment afforded by artworks,
and at most only derivatively on the true beauty of artworks. As Levinson puts it:
The crucial practical, as opposed to exegetical, question concerning
Hume’s solution to the problem of taste is why one should care what is
truly beautiful, if one accepts Hume’s account of how such things are
identified, to wit, through the converging verdicts of ideal critics.
(Levinson 2006, p. 372-373)
If art-lovers’ main concern is true beauty, instead of the maximisation of their own
enjoyment, the practical question ‘why one should care what is truly beautiful’
would not make any sense. As a result, the ‘real problem’ is not really a problem for
Hume, at least within the scope of ‘Of the Standard of Taste’.
Moreover, even if we allow that Hume—being a philosopher, but not merely the
author of that essay—should in some sense respond to this problem, it is still not
very clear how important the ‘real problem’ is. After all, if the problem is how one
should maximise her enjoyment, it is just a personal matter. Many factors figure in
her consideration, including her education level, prior exposure to the art world,
sensibility to beauty, amount of leisure, humour, cultural environment, etc. These
should all be taken into account in her cost-benefit analysis. Due to the particularity
and complexity of such concerns, there is hardly any interesting general answer to be
provided.
If we only focus on the estimation of enjoyment to be afforded by the
appreciation of artworks, we still cannot see the significance of the ‘real problem’.
The standard of taste would only be interesting to those who care about what is truly
beautiful. There is no reason to impose on Hume any claim which requires everyone
to be bound by a standard of taste. If a person just wants to maximise her enjoyment,
why should Hume try to force or convince her to listen to the joint verdict of true
judges? We have pointed out that making correct judgements of the beauty of
artworks and maximising one’s own enjoyment of art need not coincide. Although it
is claimed that the best artworks could afford the highest enjoyment a human being is
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capable of having, it does not mean that such enjoyment must be able to offset all the
effort and sacrifice required for a person to acquire the ability to enjoy it. All these
are just practical, but not philosophical, considerations of life-planning for an
individual person. Hume does not need to provide any answer to the ‘real problem’.

B. A Circular Definition?
One of the most famous criticisms of Hume’s ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ is the
charge of circularity. It is roughly the view that Hume defines good works of art as
those approved by good critics, and good critics as those who approve good works of
art. One particular formulation of the problem is provided by Peter Kivy:
(1) good works of art are works of art approved by good critics; (2) good
critics are critics possessing five requisite qualities; and (3) critics
possessing the five requisite qualities are critics who approve good works
of art. (Kivy 1967, p. 60)
Kivy’s own solution to this problem consists in an attempt to show that three of the
five requisite qualities (delicacy, lack of prejudice, and good sense) can be defined
without appealing to good artworks. Whether his attempt succeeds is not our concern
here. Rather, a problem in the formulation of the problem itself should be considered.
Kivy thinks that Hume defines good artworks in terms of good critics. However,
this claim is questionable. The truth seems to be that Hume has not provided any
definition of good artworks in his ‘Of the Standard of Taste’. Although it is true that
good artworks are those approved by good critics, but it seems this just follows from
the claim that good critics are those who approve good artworks. Merely being a true
claim about good artworks does not mean that it is a definition of good artworks.
Indeed, it would be strange that if Hume does really provide any definition of good
artworks here. ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ is an essay on our judgement concerning
the operation of taste in the realm of art criticism. It does not aim at telling its reader
what is a good or bad artwork; rather, it aims at providing an account of how we
could determine when our taste could be trusted in judging the beauty and deformity
of artworks, and hence their goodness. It should be objected that beauty and
deformity are not the only qualities which are relevant to the evaluation of artworks;
but granted this problematic assumption, a correct understanding of the essay’s aim
should not prompt us to expect any definition of good artworks. Hume would
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probably reserve this project of defining good artworks to art critics, or at least, to
another occasion where he writes as an art critic. Some specific qualities which
contribute to the beauty or deformity of artworks might be identified in such
definition, but this is outside of our concerns here.
This response might not be satisfactory, and it is in no way meant to be
conclusive. A stronger reply to this charge of circularity is directed to the contention
that Hume defines good critics in terms of good artworks, or, in particular, the
second and third claim in Kivy’s formulation. Kivy’s second claim defines good
critics as those possessing the five requisite qualities. This might seem to commit
him to the view that these five qualities form a complete list of the requisite qualities,
but this would not be something we would like to accept. We have seen previously in
Chapter 10 that these five traits are found in experience to be contributive to the
improvement of a person’s ability in judging the beauty of artworks. This makes it a
contingent fact that they are thus associated with good critics, and we should better
allow the possibility of there being some other qualities omitted by Hume. 25
A better way to formulate Kivy’s claims would be:
(2’) Good critics are critics whose internal organs are sound;
and
(3’) Critics whose internal organs are sound approve of good works of art.
However, although (3’) may not seem false to some readers, it should still be rejected,
because Hume would not define those critics in this way. For Hume, (3’) would be
too narrow. Critics whose state of internal organs is sound do not only approve good
works of art. They do so in virtue of their taste, the operation of which is in an ideal
condition, so that it can be trusted in judging the beauty and deformity of artworks.
Even if we might assume for the sake of simplicity that beauty and deformity are the
only factors which ultimately determine the artistic value of an artwork, so that a
beautiful artwork is a good artwork, and a deformed one is bad, we should not think
that Hume defines artistic beauty and deformity in terms of good and bad artworks.
Rather, he tells us that:
Some particular forms or qualities, from the original structure of the
internal fabric, are calculated to please, and others to displease; and if they
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Examples of other qualities include ‘[e]motional receptivity or openness’ and ‘serenity of mind or
capacity for reflection’ (Levinson 2006, p. 371), courage (Durà-Vilà 2014, p. 77).
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fail of their effect in any particular instance, it is from some apparent
defect or imperfection in the organ. (E-ST, p. 271)
Those which please in this way are beautiful, and those which displease are
deformed. Accordingly, it seems fair to think that Hume implicitly defines beauty as
the kind of forms or qualities which please in virtue of the original internal structure
of the human mind, and deformity is the kind of forms or qualities which displease in
the same manner. The internal structure referred to here is surely not the physical
structure of the human mind. Rather, it is actually the totality of the original
principles according to which passions are caused in the human mind. Therefore, it
might be clearer to re-cast the definition as: beauty is the kind of forms or qualities
which please according to certain original principles of the human mind, and
deformity is the kind of forms or qualities which displease in the same manner.
Given this general definition of beauty and deformity, we could then add a restriction
that the forms or qualities should be considered from the viewpoint of the intended
audience to make it a definition of artistic beauty and deformity. There is no need to
mention good or bad artworks in this definition, and hence the charge that the
definition is circular fails.
It might be objected that my response is only effective against this particular
version, as another circular definition could be found in Hume’s essay. Given the
above definition of beauty and deformity, a circular definition can be formed by
adding a second definition, which defines those original principles of the human
mind mentioned in the first definition as the principles of human mind according to
which beauty pleases and deformity displeases. Thus, those original principles of the
human mind and beauty and deformity are defined in terms of each other.
In response to this second version of a circular definition, the last thing we
would do is to reject the first definition, as our acceptance of it grounds our rejection
of the first version of the circular definition. Therefore, we should start by examining
the second definition. We might ask first, is there any other way to define those
original principles? A possibility seems to be to give an extensional definition which
lists all those particular original principles, but two problems arise.
First, these particular principles would probably be something which connect a
certain impression of forms or qualities to pleasure or displeasure, but unless we
appeal to a prior distinction between the pleasure of beauty and the displeasure of
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deformity and other kinds of pleasure and displeasure, it seems this list might include
irrelevant original principles. This means we could not break the circle by giving an
extensional definition.
Second, we do not have direct access to such original principles. All we can
have are just some observations of their particular manifestations, which is
determined by external situations. From such observations, we might be able to form
some general rules connecting certain forms or qualities with pleasure or displeasure,
and perhaps we might also be able to reduce them into rules which are more general;
but we could never know whether such general rules correspond exactly to those
original principles. This means that it is impossible for us to provide any extensional
definition.
Hume would respond to the first problem by asserting that:
[U]nder the term pleasure, we comprehend sensations, which are very
different from each other, and which have only such a distant resemblance,
as is requisite to make them be express’d by the same abstract term. (T
3.1.2.4)
Both ‘pleasure’ and ‘displeasure’ are abstract terms which refer to distinct sensations
which have only a distant resemblance. That the same term is used should not lead us
to think that we are not able to distinguish different kinds of pleasure and displeasure.
We do as a matter of fact have a prior distinction of the pleasure of beauty and the
displeasure of deformity and other kinds of pleasure and displeasure. Moreover,
although we should also distinguish different kinds of pleasure and displeasure by
the manners they are produced, we also know how to make such distinctions. Only
when the forms or qualities are considered in general would the pleasure or
displeasure produced be that of beauty or deformity. Should this response be
accepted? Perhaps, but then Hume still needs to respond to the second problem.
It seems Hume should agree with what the problem states. However, he might
continue by saying that this is an inevitable result of his experimental method. Recall
a passage cited in Chapter 1:
And tho’ we must endeavour to render all our principles as universal as
possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all
effects from the simplest and fewest causes, ’tis still certain we cannot go
beyond experience; and any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the
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ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as
presumptuous and chimerical. (T Intro. 8)
On the one hand, we should aim at generalising the principles formed in our science
of human nature as far as the limit of experience allows. On the other hand, Hume
tells us from the very beginning that we cannot discover any ultimate original
principles of human nature. This means we are indeed unable to have any clear idea
of what he calls ‘original principles’. As we keep on generalising the principles
already formed on our experience, we imagine that this process might continue. As it
is certain that we must never be able to form principles more general than the
ultimate original principles, we imagine that we might at last arrive at some general
principles which correspond exactly to the original principles, despite the fact that
we can never know this correspondence, and thus can never claim to have made such
a discovery.
Moreover, as ‘all reasonings from experience are founded on the supposition,
that the course of nature will continue uniformly the same’ (A 13), and Hume’s
science of human nature is constituted by reasonings from experience, the uniformity
of nature is a presupposition of Hume’s science of human nature. The existence of
original principles of human nature is just a particular instance of this presupposition.
Insofar as ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ is part of Hume’s enterprise of developing a
science of human nature, the existence of original principles is an inevitable
presupposition. Therefore, the two definitions in the second version of the circular
definition should not be taken literally. The first definition might be clarified as
saying that beauty is the kind of forms or qualities when considered in general are
found to cause pleasure of beauty, and deformity is the kind of forms or qualities
when consider in general are found to cause displeasure of deformity. The inclusion
of the term ‘beauty’ in the definiens is harmless, as it refers to a certain kind of forms
or qualities in the definiendum, but in the definiens, it refers to a certain kind of
sentiment. Similarly for ‘deformity’. This revised definition does not affect our
rejection of the first version of circular definition, as it still does not mention ‘good
or bad artworks’.
As for the second definition, it is now irrelevant to the first definition, so we
need not revise it. The only term in the revised definition of beauty and deformity
which seems to require a further definition is ‘in general’. We can say that ‘in
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general’ means in the absence of personal particular interest inaccessible to other
people. Also, in order to approximate to the meaning carried by ‘original principle’,
it should also function as a restriction on the way of considering the forms or
qualities to the extent that the highest regularity and uniformity of experience could
be achieved. It is not clear whether we can define ‘in general’ without mentioning
the idea of ‘original principle but still capture fully the original thought expressed by
the first definition. If not, perhaps this might support the thought that the existence of
original principles is a presupposition of reasoning, rather than something acquired
from experience. In any case, it seems a definition of ‘in general’ would not mention
‘beauty’ and ‘deformity’, and hence there is no threat of circularity.

C. Ideal Judges
As the true standard of taste is identified as the joint verdict of true judges, we can
find the true standard of taste only if we can consult the joint verdict of true judges.
So if they are ideal, it means we cannot find the true standard of taste. What Hume
says is just useless in practice. On the contrary, it is not clear how a real judge could
possess all five traits of a true judge as perfections. This does not seem to be just a
matter of rarity—it is simply impossible.
Our discussion in Chapter11 has demonstrated that the true standard of taste as
the joint verdict of true judges is just an imaginary standard. We imagine, but do not
find in experience, some critics who have the best possible taste. This means that true
judges are ideal. However, in order to be more confident of this conclusion, we
should examine what reasons might be provided to support the view that true judges
are real.
James Shelley supports the view that true judges are ideal. His reason is a
textual one, which appeals to Hume’s reference to the five traits as perfections
(Shelley 1994, p. 439b). 26 He thinks that even the two kinsmen in the wine tasting
example from Don Quixote also do not possess delicacy of taste, because each of
them fails to notice every ingredient in the wine, and hence they are not true judges.
Stephanie Ross argues against Shelley by pointing out that the conditions of practice
26

Note that Shelley maintains in the same article that a person might consult the true judges, and their
joint verdict ‘can assure us that a particular difference of taste represents an inequality of taste’
(Shelley 2004, p. 438b-439a). It seems that he is contradicting himself by saying that true judges are
ideal and that true judges can actually be consulted by non-ideal critics.
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and forming comparison cannot be understood as perfections because ‘they are not
properly conceived of as whole or completed’, as they must involve ‘the gradual
accumulation of experience’ (Ross 2008, p. 22-23). Also, she thinks that ‘it is always
possible to engage in further practice and/or to entertain additional comparisons’,
and this possibility obtains only for actual beings, so true judges are real (ibid, p. 23).
Ross’s first reason cannot support her conclusion. In order for her first reason to
be relevant, Ross has to deny that we have ideas formed by imagination which go
beyond the boundary of experience, but we should not accept this consequence. That
the conditions of practice and forming comparison must involve ‘the gradual
accumulation of experience’ only holds for the ideas formed within the limit of
experience. However, Hume thinks that, upon the repeated observations that more
practice and more comparison formed can improve our judgement of beauty, our
imagination continues its motion and imagines that for any judgement of beauty, it
could be further improved by more practice and more comparison formed.
In addition, it can also be observed repeatedly that the more practice and more
comparison formed, the smaller is the improvement of our judgement. Therefore, our
imagination also imagines that there will be some stage at which no further
improvement is possible. At that stage, the critic would be ‘perfectly practiced’ and
have formed ‘perfectly sufficient comparisons’.
These two ideas of perfections are formed by the imagination, whose operation
is not controlled by reason. That they are irrational, or could not be properly
conceived, does not mean that we cannot have such ideas. Unless it has been shown
in advance that the idea of a true judge is an idea formed totally within the limit of
experience, Ross’s first reason cannot show that the two conditions of true judges are
not conceived as perfections. Note that although Hume rejects the idea of going
beyond the limit of experience in his science of human nature, he does not ask for a
complete elimination of every idea formed by the imagination operating beyond the
limit of experience. That we have such ideas is one of the facts of human nature,
which calls for explanation, but not reformation. All Hume demands is that in
rational enquiries, we should limit ourselves to employing only those ideas which
stay within the limits of experience.
As for Ross’s second reason, it needs to be clarified. If that ‘it is always
possible to engage in further practice and/or to entertain additional comparisons’ can
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be counted as a reason against the construal of the two conditions as perfections, then
it seems Ross is implicitly assuming that if the two conditions can be construed as
perfections, then it is impossible to engage in further practice and/or to entertain
additional comparisons, and her argument should be a modus tollens. If this is the
case, then the conditional should be questioned. Why would the two conditions
construed as perfections make it impossible to engage in further practice and/or to
entertain additional comparisons? It is reasonable to say that in this case, further
practice and additional comparisons will not improve the judgement of beauty made
by a critic having these perfections, but if she wants to do so, she can.
It seems Ross either actually means that it is always possible to improve one’s
judgement of beauty by engaging in further practice and/or by entertaining additional
comparisons, or her argument involves a hidden premise which is a false conditional,
and hence should be rejected. A charitable reading should reject the second disjunct,
so we should consider the first disjunct, which is a revised version of Ross’s second
reason.
Given what we have just said in our discussion of her first reason, it is obvious
that this revised version is self-defeating. What it says is exactly what a person
would think when her imagination has gone beyond the limit of experience. By
reason alone, we can never arrive at the conclusion that improvement is always
possible. It is by custom that our imagination makes us expect such a possibility.
However, we have also seen that this cannot be the whole picture, as the imagination
also leads a person to expect that, ultimately, no further improvement could be made.
Ross then faces a dilemma: either she should deny that the imagination can go
beyond experience, or accept that such an operation of the imagination also leads to
the ideas of the two conditions construed as perfections. The first horn forces her to
give up her second reason, both the original version and the revised version; the
second horn forces her to accept that we have the two ideas which she wants to deny.
No matter which horn she would choose, she fails to show that true judges are real.
As a result, we can still understand the five traits as perfections which ‘can
alone entitle a critic to [the] valuable character’ of true judge (E-ST, p. 278), and
since actual judges cannot possess all such perfections, true judges are ideal.

D. Standard of Taste: Rule or Joint Verdict
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So far in our discussion of the standard of taste, we have stuck to the characterisation
of it as the joint verdict of true judges. However, in the earlier part of ‘Of the
Standard of Taste’, there is a short but crucial paragraph, that is, paragraph 6, which
seems to characterise it in another way:
It is natural for us to seek a Standard of Taste; a rule, by which the various
sentiments of men may be reconciled; at least, a decision, afforded,
confirming one sentiment, and condemning another. (E-ST, p. 268)
Some discussions have emerged concerning the relation between these two
seemingly quite different characterisations. 27 The most common way to express the
problem is to ask whether Hume thinks that the standard of taste is a rule or a joint
verdict. There is also a tendency to identify the rule mentioned in paragraph 6 with a
general rule of art discussed later in Hume’s essay, and also to identify the decision
with the joint verdict of true judges. As a result, there are two other formulations of
the problem: whether the standard of taste is the set of general rules of art or the joint
verdict of true judges? Or whether the standard of taste is a rule or a decision? The
last formulation seems to have led people such as Wieand (1984) to focus on
paragraph 6 and sometimes even to suspect that this paragraph provides inconsistent
characterisations. However, the identifications of ‘rule’ and ‘decision’ in paragraph 6
as ‘rule of art’ and ‘joint verdict’ respectively seem to have muddied the water,
rather than to have contributed to our understanding of Hume’s essay. In the
following, it will first be shown that both identifications are not well supported, and
indeed should be rejected. This will involve an argument to show that the standard of
taste cannot consist in general rules of art, and also a clarification of the relations
between ‘rule’ and ‘decision’ in paragraph 6. Second, an account will be provided to
show how paragraph 6 should be understood given Hume’s view that the standard of
taste is the joint verdict of true judges; our suggestion is that there is also an actual
but fallible standard of taste.
Strictly speaking, both the identification of ‘rule’ with ‘rule of art’ and that of
‘decision’ with ‘joint verdict’ lack textual evidence, as Hume has never explicitly
made these identifications. For those who make the first identification, perhaps they
are motivated by the fact that the only kind of rules discussed in Hume’s essay is
what he calls alternatively ‘rules of composition’, ‘rules of criticism’, ‘rules of art’,
27

Probably the most central texts on this problem are Wieand (1984) and Shelley (1994).
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‘rules of beauty’. 28 However, this could hardly be counted as an evidence for the
first identification. Instead of merely appealing to the fact that no other kind of rules
is mentioned in the essay, some positive reason should be provided. Usually,
supporters of this identification argue that the standard of taste consists in a set of
rules of art. If this is what Hume thinks, then the identification is strongly supported
by the characterisation of a standard of taste as a rule in paragraph 6. Therefore, we
should determine whether it is the case that the standard of taste consists in a set of
rules of art.
Given the interpretation we have developed so far, we can see why the standard
of taste does not consist in a set of rules of art: the two items perform different
functions. General rules of art are generalisations of our experience of what we have
observed to please or displease generally. They concern what is beautiful. On the
other hand, standard of taste concern the operation of taste, which help us to
determine when our taste can be trusted in judging beauty. The very concept of rules
of art itself does not impose any restriction on who can form such generalisations.
Indeed, both true judges and critics with defective taste can form rules of art on the
basis of their experience. We have no reason to suppose that those with defective
taste will have completely chaotic artistic experience. Insofar as there can be a
certain degree of regularity in their experience, it is sufficient for their imagination to
form some general rules. With these general rules implicitly or explicitly in mind,
they are then able to identify the possible causes of their pleasure or displeasure, just
as true judges do.
If we compare the two sets of rules of art, that of the true judges and that of
those inferior critics, we need some standard to decide which set is better. However,
this standard cannot itself be another set of rules of art, because we would then be
required to find some further standard to establish its authenticity. Hume’s proposal
is that we should judge these set of rules of art by judging the taste of the respective
groups of critics, and only the sets of rules of art formed by true judges will be
established. Some general rules concerning the operation of taste which correspond
to the five traits of true judges have been discussed in Chapter 10, and in Chapter 11
we have seen in what sense the joint verdict of true judges is both the true standard
28

Wieand is right in saying that they are actually the same, but are only referred by different labels
depending on the purpose of their employment (Wieand 1984, p. 131). Following him, the expression
‘rules of art’ will be used throughout our discussion.
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of taste and of beauty. For the problem in hand now, it is sufficient to have
acknowledged the different roles performed by the standard of taste and rules of art.
It has seldom been noticed that beauty and taste require different kinds of
judgements. This confusion of the two kinds of judgement might explain the worry
concerning the fallibility of particular rules of art. Hume explicitly holds that if the
prediction drawn from a rule of art disagrees with the actual sentiment felt by critics
with sound taste, then the rule should be revised or abandoned. Together with the
view that the standard of taste is a set of rules of art by which various sentiments are
confirmed or condemned, it is not clear whether sentiment or rules of art should be
taken as more authoritative. Even if we grant that, for true judges, there is no
discrepancy between the sentiment felt and the prediction drawn from rules of art,
there is still a difficulty. Unless a critic has been established as a true judge, she
would have no idea whether she should trust her sentiment or the prediction of some
rules of art she holds. It has to be explained how a certain set of rules of art could be
established as correct, from which a standard of taste can be derived. One possibility
is to argue that only those provided by true judges should be accepted; but we have
seen in Chapter 10 that we cannot determine whether a critic is a true judge, and
even if we put aside this problem, without distinguishing the different task of judging
beauty and judging taste, this view might then be trapped in a circle by saying that
true judges are those who judge according to the correct rules of art, or that the five
traits of true judges are what make them judge according to the correct rules of art.
In contrast, our interpretation, which does not take rules of art as constituting
the standard of taste, does not suffer from the same difficulty. According to our
interpretation, judgements of beauty are not made with any reference to rules of art;
rather, we ensure that the operation of our taste conforms to the standard of taste, and
then we judge the beauty of an artwork according to our sentiment. The authority of
sentiment as the ultimate standard of beauty is preserved. We do not need to be
worried by any conflict between particular rules of art and our sentiment, as those
rules do not constitute any standard by which sentiment are judged. The use of rules
of art is just to help us identify the true cause of our sentiment. When correctly
formed, they connect our private sentiment to its cause which is publicly accessible.
With these rules, we are able to discuss the beauty or deformity of artworks, so that
we could convince our opponents or detect pretenders.
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With these considerations, it seems we have a strong reason to reject the view
that the standard of taste consists in a set of rules of art. We can now move on to the
second identification, that is, the identification of ‘decision’ in paragraph 6 with
‘joint verdict’. In order to reject this identification, we have to clarify the relation
between ‘rule’ and ‘decision’ in paragraph 6. As suggested by Wieand, this relation
might be interpreted in two ways: first, the standard of taste is a rule by which
sentiments may be reconciled, or in cases where the sentiments are not reconciled,
this rule may at least afford a decision which confirms and condemns the various
sentiment; or second, the standard is either a rule or a decision (Wieand 1984, p.
130).
Wieand rejects the first interpretation because he thinks that it wrongly ‘marks
off reconciliation from the confirming and condemning of sentiments’ (ibid.). If he
has understood it correctly, then we should agree with him, but it is not clear why
this interpretation should be understood in this way. It could be consistently
understood as saying that the rule always affords a decision which confirms and
condemns various sentiments, while sometimes something extra also happens, that is,
the reconciliation of sentiments. Understood in this way, the reconciliation is not
marked off from, but rather based on the confirmation and condemnation of various
sentiments. This is a much more natural way to understand the word ‘reconciliation’.
On the other hand, Wieand thinks that the second interpretation implies that
Hume might mean that ‘a reconciliation just is a confirmation or condemnation’ (ibid,
p. 131). It is not clear why this follows; but if he is right, then this should be counted
as a reductio of this interpretation, as this is not an acceptable understanding of
‘reconciliation’. The second interpretation could be rejected on another ground.
Assume for the sake of argument that this is the right interpretation, and consider the
case in which the standard of taste is not a rule, but is a decision. Since the text tells
us that the decision is afforded by something, so we should ask in this case what
affords this decision which is also the standard of taste. It is difficult to answer this
question, but for our purpose, we do not need to give a definite answer. For those
who identify ‘decision’ with ‘joint verdict’, they could not answer that the decision is
afforded by the joint verdict. Would it be afforded by some rules of art? No, because
this would just be saying that there are some rules of art which afforded the standard
as decision but themselves are not the standard. This should be rejected because if
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we ask here what could justify those rules of art to be something which could afford
a standard of taste as decision, which is in turn identified as the joint verdict of true
judges, this position will then appear to be claiming that the ideal and infallible
verdict could be afforded by something fallible. This is a highly suspicious position
and hence we should reject the identification of ‘decision’ with ‘joint verdict’ if the
second interpretation were accepted.
As we have rejected the first interpretation as understood by Wieand, the only
alternative interpretation we have in hand is the revised version of the first
interpretation suggested above, that is, that the standard as a rule always affords a
decision which confirms and condemns various sentiments, while sometimes,
reconciliation of sentiments might be achieved in addition. We might accept for the
sake of argument the identification of ‘decision’ with ‘joint verdict’, and see what
would follow. This interpretation says that the decision is afforded by a rule, so what
is this rule? Again, this cannot be the joint verdict, as it should not be able to afford
itself. We have also rejected the view that the standard of taste consists of rules of art.
It seems there are only two possibilities remaining: the general rules concerning the
operation of taste in terms of the five traits, or an actual standard of taste, which is
the verdict of the best judge in a discussion.
With regard to the first possibility, one might suggest that such general rules
allow us to determine who the true judges are, and ‘afford’ their joint verdict. The
problem of this suggestion is that neither our ideas of the five traits as perfections nor
our comparative ideas of them are marks by which true judges or better judges are
known. This has been shown in Chapter 10. We know who performs better on these
five aspects only after we have already judged who has better taste; but if we have
already know whose taste is better, even if we assume that we could then find the
true judges by discussing with all critics in the world, we do not need those general
rules to know the joint verdict. It does not make sense to say that they afford the joint
verdict.
As for the second possibility, it would mean that the joint verdict of true judges
could be afforded by a fallible verdict of a less than perfect judge. Even if we allow
that the infallible verdict can be somehow drawn from a fallible verdict, this would
not fit with the concessive tone of the ‘at least’ in paragraph 6.
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As it seems the identification of ‘decision’ with ‘joint verdict’ renders
paragraph 6 problematic under this interpretation and the second interpretation
provided by Wieand, together with our rejection of his first interpretation as
understood by him, we might conclude that unless there is some other interpretation
of paragraph 6, the identification of ‘decision’ with ‘joint verdict’ should be rejected
if paragraph 6 can be understood without this identification.
We can now move on to the next step, that is, our account of how paragraph 6
should be understood. The revised interpretation provided above—that the standard
as a rule always affords a decision which confirms and condemns various sentiments,
while sometimes, reconciliation of sentiments might be achieved in addition—will
be adopted. What we need to do is to add more detail to it in order to fully
understand it. The proposal is that, the word ‘rule’ here means what we call ‘a ruling’
nowadays. The Oxford English Dictionary defines it as ‘[a]n order made by a judge
or court with reference to a particular case only’ (Definition 4.a, ‘rule, n.1’). This
meaning is rarely used nowadays outside legal contexts, but it was used more often
in Hume’s age. It should not be surprising that Hume might use it in this way, given
that he studied law from 1726 to 1729. Moreover, in The Life of David Hume, the
author, E. C. Mossner, tells us that ‘[i]n the end, Hume’s legal knowledge, both
theoretical and practical, was not inconsiderable. … In short, David Hume was fully
qualified to become an advocate’ (Mossner 1980, p. 55).
In paragraph 6, Hume extends the meaning of ‘rule’ from legal context to the
realm of beauty, and means by it a judgement of beauty made with reference to a
particular case only. Understood in this way, a ‘rule’ is just the joint verdict of true
judges when we talk about the true standard of taste, or a verdict made by the critic
whose taste is the best in a discussion when we talk about an actual but fallible
standard. In either way, a rule affords us a decision which confirms those sentiments
which agree with it, and condemns those which disagree with it. Here, the word
‘decision’ does not have any special meaning—it just means a decision. Sometimes,
but not always, those critics whose sentiment is condemned are convinced by those
whose sentiment is confirmed, so that the former view the artwork in a different way,
and come to share the latter’s sentiment. Various sentiments are thus reconciled in
virtue of the confirmation and condemnation of sentiments. However, there are bad
critics who refuse to listen to others’ views and stick firmly to their own judgements.
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In such cases, we might still confirm and condemn different sentiments, but they are
not reconciled.
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Conclusion
We have gone through a long journey in developing our interpretation of Hume’s ‘Of
the Standard of Taste’. I should end by recapitulating some key features of this
interpretation.
We started with an overview of some key feature of Hume’s philosophy in Part
I. In Chapter 1 we highlighted his experimental method. This method is supported by
his view on the limit of experience. We introduced in Chapter 2 the basic categories
of items within this limit. Such items are the materials on which human mind
operates. Two kinds of mental operations were discussed afterward: the formation
and application of general rules in Chapter 3, and sympathy in Chapter 4. Lastly, this
part ended with an attempt in Chapter 5 to clarify the distinction between two
principal parts of human nature: reason and the passions.
Part II narrowed down our focus on Hume’s aesthetic thought. Chapter 6
surveyed a few distinctions between different senses of ‘beauty’, among which the
distinction between sentiment-view and the quality-view is the central one. Chapter 7
tried to explain what judgements of beauty are, but failed to address the question
how critics identify the true cause of their sentiment of beauty. In the meantime, we
brought forth the importance of judgements of taste, understood as judgements which
concern the soundness of the operation of taste, rather than those which are made in
virtue of taste, such as judgements of beauty and moral judgements.
Part III is the place where we started the construction of our interpretation of
‘Of the Standard of Taste’. A summary of the essay is given in Chapter 8. Relatively
large amount of effort was spent on the earlier part of the essay in order to search for
Hume’s aim in writing it: to supply a philosophical analysis of the commonsensical
view that ‘the taste of all individuals is not on an equal footing’ and can be evaluated.
This finding illuminated the structure of the whole essay, and facilitated our
succeeding discussion. Part 9 is an attempt to unveil the nature of art criticism in
light of Hume’s thought. It showed that, contrary to the common reading of the essay,
we can evaluate different judgements of beauty before we know which critic is better.
It also involved a digression on the role of general rules of art, which showed that
their main role is to help critics in identifying the possible causes of their sentiment
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of beauty. We found that it is also one of the functions of taste to single out the true
cause among the possible causes.
As we moved on to Chapter 10, we turned to Hume’s idea of true judges and
their five traits. We demonstrated the seemingly devastating impossibility of
knowing such a preferable character. The true standard of taste and beauty which is
identified by Hume as the joint verdict of true judges is thus shown to be useless.
However, in Chapter 11, we introduced Hume’s idea of an imaginary standard. We
argued that the true standard of taste is indeed an imaginary standard by giving a
genesis of the idea of it. This discovery showed that although the true standard of
taste is useless, this does not prevent Hume from achieving his aim in the essay.
The first half of Chapter 12 clarified Hume’s freedom-from-prejudice
requirement; while the second half resolve the apparent tension between this
requirement and the two blameless sources of variation. A better understanding of
how sympathy works in our judgements of beauty was thus acquired, and further
enhanced by our solution for the problem of moral prejudice presented in Chapter 13.
This solution relies heavily on the difference between natural relations and
philosophical relations provided in Chapter 2.
Finally, in Chapter 14, we responded to four controversies concerning Hume’s
essay. We discussed in turn Levinson’s ‘Real Problem’, the charge of circularity, the
question whether true judges are real or ideal, and the suggestion of Hume’s gives
two standards of taste. The responses provided to these four controversies are
grounded firmly in our interpretation, which is significantly based on resources from
Hume’s major philosophical works. The success of these responses will add
plausibility to our interpretation; or, at least, it will show the advantage of all similar
interpretative strategies which integrate ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ with Hume’s
system.
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